

SENECA'S
MORALS

By way of
ABSTRACT.

Of Benefits.

PART I.

By R. L'ESTRANGE.

L O N D O N,

Printed by *Tho. Newcomb* for *Henry Broome*, at
the *Gun* in *St. Pauls Church-yard*. 1678

THE

MONIALS

BY

ABSTRACT

OF BENEFITS

PART I

BY R. ESTRAVE

LONDON

Printed by T. W. Newman for Henry Broomfield
the One in St. Pauls Church-yard 1688



THE Contents.

Chap. I.

OF Benefits in General Page ii

Chap. II.

Several sorts of Benefits p. 5.

Chap. III.

*A Son may oblige his Father, and a Ser-
vant his Master* P. 9.

A 2

Chap. IV.

The Contents.

Chap. IV.

It is the Intention, not the Matter, that makes the Benefit p. 18.

Chap. V.

There must be Judgment in a Benefit, as well as Matter, and Intention, and especially in the Choice of the Person. p. 24.

Chap. VI.

The Matter of Obligations, with its Circumstances. p. 29.

Chap. VII.

The Manner of Obliging p. 37.

Chap. VIII.

The Difference, and Value of Benefits p. 46.

Chap. IX.

An honest Man cannot be out-done in Courtesy p. 57.

Chap. X.

The Contents.

Chap. X.

*The Question discussed, whether or no a
Man may Give, or Return a Benefit
to himself* P. 64

Chap. XI.

*How far one Man may be Oblig'd for a
Benefit done to another* P. 69.

Chap. XII.

The Benefactor must have no By-ends P. 75.

Chap. XIII.

*There are many Cases wherein a Man
may be Mind'd of a Benefit, but it is
very rarely to be Challeng'd, and ne-
ver to be Upbraided,* P. 90.

XIX.

Chap. XIV.

The Contents.

Chap. XIV.

*How far to Oblige, or Requite a Wicked
Man.* P. 103.

Chap. XV.

*A General view of the Parts, and Du-
ties of the Benefactor.* P. 116

Chap. XVI.

*How the Receiver ought to behave him-
self.* P. 125.

Chap. XVII.

Of Gratitude P. 138.

Chap. XVIII.

Gratitude Mistaken P. 147.

Chap. XIX.

Of Ingratitude P. 154.

Chap. XX.

The Contents.

Chap: XX.

*There can be no Law against Ingrati-
tude* P. 164.

A 4

T O


The Contents

Chap. XX.

There can be no Law without Justice

P. 161

OT 4 A



TO THE READER.

IT has been a long time
in my Thought to turn
Seneca into *English* :
But, whether as a *Trans-*
lation, or an *Abstract*, was the
Question. A *Translation* I per-
ceive it must not be, at last, for
several Reasons. First, It is a
thing already done to my hand,
and of above Sixty years stand-
ing ; though with as little *Credit*
perhaps

perhaps to the *Author*, as *Satisfaction* to the *Reader*. Secondly, There are a thousand things in him, that are wholly forreign to my Business: As his Philosophical Treatises of *Meteors*, *Earthquakes*, the Original of *Rivers*; several frivolous Disputes betwixt the *Epicureans*, and the *Stoicks*, &c. to say nothing of his frequent Repetitions of the same thing again in other words, (wherein he very handsomely excuses himself, by saying, That he does but *Inculcate* over, and over the same Counsels; to those that over and over commit the same Faults.) Thirdly; His Excellency Consists rather in a *Rhapsody* of Divine, and Extraordinary Hints, and Notions, than in any Regulated Method of Discourse;

course; so that to take him as he lies, and to go thorough with him, were utterly inconsistent with the *Order*, and *Brevity* which I propound; my Principal design being only to digest, and Common-Place his *Maxims*, in such sort, that any Man, upon occasion, may know where to find them. And, I have kept my self so close to this Proposition, that I have reduc'd all his scatter'd *Eubiques* to their proper *Heads*, without any Additions of my own, more than of absolute Necessity for the Tacking of them together. Some other Man, in my Place, would, perchance, make you twenty Apologies, for his want of Skill, and Address, in governing this Affair, but these are *Formal*, and *Pedantique* *Folleries*:

series: As if any Man that first takes himself for a Coxcomb in his-own Heart, would afterwards make himself one in Print too. This *Abstract*, such as it is, you are extremely wellicome to; and I am sorry it is no better, both for your sakes and my own: for, if it were written up to the Spirit of the *Original*, it would be one of the most valuable Presents that ever any private Man bestow'd upon the Publick: And this too, even in the Judgment of both Parties, as well Christian as Heathen: of which in its due place.

Next to my Choice of the *Author*, and of the *Subject*, together with the *Manner* of handling it, I have likewise had some regard

regard in this Publication, to the *Timing* of it, and to the Preference of this *Topique* of *Benefits* above all others, for the Ground-work of my *first Essay*. We are fallen into an Age of *vain Philosophy*; (as the Holy Apostle calls it) and so desperately over-run with *Drolls* and *Scepticks*, that there is hardly any thing so *Certain*, or so *Sacred*, that is not exposed to *Question*, or *Contempt*. Insomuch, that betwixt the *Hypocrite*, and the *Atheist*, the very *Foundations* of *Religion*, and *good Manners* are shaken, and the Two *Tables* of the *Decalogue* dash'd to pieces, the one against the other: The *Laws* of *Government* are Subjected to the *Phanxies* of the *Vulgar*; *Publick Authority* to the *Private Passions* and *Opinions* of

of the People; and the Supernatural Motions of Grace confounded with the Common Distates of Nature. In this State of Corruption, who so fit as a good honest *Christian-Pagan*, for a Moderator betwixt *Pagan-Christians*?

To pass now from the General Scope of the Whole work, to the particular Argument of this following Discourse; I have pitch'd upon the Theme of *Benefits, Gratitude and Ingratitude*, to begin withall, as an Earnest of the Rest, and a Lecture expressly Calculated for the Unthankfulness of these Times: the foulest undoubtedly, and the most execrable of all others, since the very Apostacy of the Angels: Nay, if

I durst but suppose a Possibility of Mercy for those Damned Spirits, and that they might ever be taken into Favour again, my Charity would hope even better from them, than we have found from some of our Revolters, and that they would so behave themselves, as not to incur a *Second Forfeiture*. And, to carry the Resemblance yet one point further, they do Both of them agree in an Implacable Malice against those of their Fellows that keep their Stations. But Alas! What could *Ingratitude* do, without *Hypocrisie*? the Inseparable Companion of it; and, in Effect, the Bolder, and the Blacker Devil of the Two? For *Lucifer* himself never had the Face to lift up his Eyes to Heaven,

ven, and talk to the Almighty at the Familiar Rate of our Pretended Patriots, and Zelots : and at the same time, to make him Party to a Cheat. 'Tis not for nothing, that the *Holy Ghost* has denounc'd so many *Woes*, and redoubl'd so many *Cautions* against *Hypocrites*; plainly intimating, at once, how dangerous a Snare they are to Mankind, and no less Odious to God himself: which is sufficiently denoted in the force of that dreadful expression, *And your Portion shall be with Hypocrites*. You will find in the Holy Scriptures (as I have formerly observ'd) that God has given the Grace of *Repentance* to *Persecuters*, *Idolaters*, *Murderers*, *Adulterers*, &c. but I am mistaken, if the whole

Bible

Bible affords you any one Instance of a *Converted Hypocrite*.

To descend now from Truth it self, to our own Experience: Have we not seen, even in our dayes, a most Pious (and almost a Faultless) Prince, brought to the Scaffold by his own Subjects? The most Glorious Constitution upon the Face of the Earth, both *Ecclesiastical* and *Civil*, torn to Pieces, and dissolv'd? The Happiest People under the Sun Enslav'd; Our Temples Sacrilegiously profan'd; and a Licence given to all sorts of Heresie, and Outrage? And by whom, but by a Race of *Hypocrites*, who had nothing in their Mouths all this while, but *The Purity of the Gospel*; *The Honour of the King*;

[b]

and

and, *The Liberty of the People*: assisted underhand with *Defamatory Papers*, which were levell'd at the *King* Himself, thorough the sides of His most faithful *Ministers*? This **PROJECT** succeeded so well against One Government, that it is now again set a foot against Another; and by some of the very Actors too in that **TRAGEDY**, and after a most Gracious Par 'on also, when Providence had laid their Necks, and their Fortunes at His Majesties Feet. It is a wonderful thing, that *Libells*, and *Libellers*, the most *infamous* of *Practises*, and of *Men*; the most *Unmanly*, *Sneaking Methods*, and *Instruments* of *Mischief*: the very *Bane* of *Humane Society*, and the *Plague* of all *Governments*: It

is a wonderful thing (I say) that these Engines, and Engineers, should ever find Credit enough in the World to engage a Party: But it would still be more wonderful, if the *same Trick*, should pass twice upon the *same People*, in the *same Age*, and from the very *same IMPOSTORS*. This Contemplation has carry'd me a little out of my way, but it has at length brought me to my Text again; for there is in the bottom of it, the highest Opposition imaginable, of *Ingratitude*, and *Obligation*.

By this Taste, the Reader will in some Measure be able to judge what he is further to expect: that is to say, as to the *Cast* of my design, and the *simplicity*

plicity of the Stile, and Dress; for that will be still the same; only accompany'd with variety of Matter. Within a *Term*, or two, I do propound (God willing) to follow This, with another *Manual*; and so to go on till I have finish'd the whole. Whether it pleases the World or not, the Care is taken: And yet I could wish that it might be as delightful to others upon the Perusal, as it has been to me in the Speculation. Next to the Gospel it self I do look upon it as the most Sovereign Remedy against the Miseries of Humane Nature; and I have ever found it so in all the Injuries and Distresses, of an Unfortunate Life. You may read more of him if you please in the *Appendix*, which

I have here Subjoyn'd to this Preface, concerning the Authority of his *Writings*, and the Circumstances of his *Life*; as I have extracted them out of *Lipsius*.

OF



O F

SENECA'S WRITINGS.

IT appears that our Author had, among the Ancients, three Profess'd Enemies. In the first place *Caligula* ; who call'd his Writings, *Sand without Lime* ; alluding to the starts of his Phancy, and the Incoherence of his Sentences. But *Seneca* was never the worse for the Censure of a Person that propounded even the suppressing of *Homer*

Homer himself; and of casting *Virgil* and *Livy* out of all *Publick Libraries*. The next, was *Fabius*; who Taxes him for being too bold with the Eloquence of former times, and failing in that point himself; and likewise for being too Queint and Finical in his Expressions: which *Tacitus* imputes, in part, to the freedom of his own particular Inclination, and partly to the Humour of the Times. He is also charg'd by *Fabius* as no profound *Philosopher*; but with all this, he allows him to be a Man very Studious, and Learned; of great Wit, and Invention; and well read in all sorts of Litterature; a severe Re-prover of Vice; most Divinely Sententious; and well worth the Reading; if it were only for his

[b 4]

Morals;

Moralls; Adding, that if his Judgment had been answerable to his Wit, it had been much the more for his Reputation: but he Wrote whatever came next: so that I would advise the Reader (sayes he) to distinguish, where He *Himself* did not: for there are many things in him, not only to be approv'd, but admir'd, and it was great Pity, that he that could do what he would, should not alwayes make the best Choice. His Third Adversary is *Agellius*, who falls upon him for his Style, and a kind of Tinkling in his Sentences; but yet commends him for his Piety, and good Counsels. On the other side, *Columella* calls him *A Man of excellent Wit and Learning*; *Pliny*; *The Prince of Erudition*; *Tacitus* gives him the Character

[A d]

Character of a *Wise Man*, and a
fit Tutor for a Prince. Dio re-
ports him to have been the *great-
est Man of his Age*.

Of those Pieces of his that are
Extant, we shall not need to
give any Particular Account:
and of those that are lost, we
cannot, any further than by
Lights to them from other Au-
thors; as we find them cited
much to his honor; and we may
reasonably compute them to be
the greater part of his Works.
That he wrote several *Poems* in
his Banishment, may be gather'd,
partly from himself; but more
expresly out of *Tacitus*, who
sayes, *That he was reproach'd
with his applying himself to Pro-
trny, after he saw that Nero took
pleasure*

pleasure in it, out of a design to
Curry-Favour. St. *Jerome* re-
 fers to a Discourse of his concern-
 ing Matrimony. *Lactantius* takes
 notice of his History, and his
 Books of *Moralities*: St. *Augustin*
 quotes some Passages of his out of
 a Book of *Superstition*: Some
 References we meet with, to his
 Books of *Exhortations*. *Fabius*
 makes mention of his *Dialogues*:
 And he himself speaks of a *Trea-*
tise of his own, concerning *Earth-*
quakes, which he wrote in his
 Youth. But the Opinion of an
Epistolary Correspondence that he
 had with St. *Paul*, does not seem
 to have much Colour for't.

Some few Fragments howe-
 ver of those Books of his that are
 wanting, are yet preserv'd in the
 Writings

Writings of other Eminent Authors ; sufficient to shew the World , how great a Treasure they have lost, by the Excellency of that little that's left.

Seneca, says Lactantius, That was the sharpest of all the Stoicks , How great a Veneration has he for the Almighty ?

*Divin. Instit.
Lib. 1. Cap. 4.*

As for Instance ; discoursing of a Violent Death : Do you not understand, says he, the Majesty, and the Authority of your Judge ? He is the Supreme Governor of Heaven and Earth, and the God of all our Gods ; and it is upon him that all those Powers depend which we Worship for Deities. Moreover in his Exhortations. This God, says he,

he, when he laid the Foundations of the Universe, and enter'd upon the greatest, and the best Work in Nature, in ordering of the Government of the World; though he was himself *all in all*, yet he substituted other Subordinate Ministers, as the Servants of his Commands. And, How many other things does this Heathen speak of God, like one of Us?

Which the Acute Seneca (sayes Laſtantius again) saw in his Exhortations. We, sayes he, have our Dependence elsewhere, and should look up to that Power unto which we are indebted for all we we can pretend to that is good.

And

And again, *Seneca* says very well in his *Morals*; they Worship the Images of the Gods, ^{Lib. 2. Cap. 2.} says he, Kneel to them, and Adore them; they are hardly ever from them, either plying them with Offerings, or Sacrifices; and yet after all this Reverence to the Image, they have no regard at all for the Workman that made it.

Lactantius again. An Inve-
ctive, (says *Seneca* in his *Exhortations*) ^{Lib. 3. Cap. 15.} is the Master-Piece of most of our *Philosophers*: and if they fall upon the Subject of Avarice, Lust, Ambition, they lash out into such Excess of Bitterness,

ternels ; as if Railing were a Mark of their Profession. They make me think of Gally-Pots in an Apothecaries Shop, that have Remedies without, and Poyson within.

Lactantius still. He that would know all things
 Lib. 5. Cap. 9. let him Read *Seneca*;
 the most lively Describer of Publick Vices, and Manners, and the smartest Repre-
 der of them.

And again : As *Seneca* has it
 in his Books of Moral Philosophy ; He
 Lib. 6. Cap. 17. is the Brave Man,
 whose Splendor, and Authority,
 is the least part of his Greatness :
 that can look Death in the Face,
 without

without Trouble, or Surprize ;
who, if his Body were to be broken upon the Wheel, or Melted Lead to be pour'd down his Throat, would be less concern'd for the Pain it self, than for the dignity of bearing it.

• Let no Man, sayes Lactantius, think himself the safer in his wickedness for want of a Witness ; Lib. 6. Cap. 14.
for God is Omniscient ; and to him nothing can be a secret. It is an admirable Sentence that Seneca concludes his Exhortations withal. GOD, sayes he, is a Great, (I know not what) an Incomprehensible Power : It is to him, that we Live ; and to him, that we must approve our selves. What does it avail us, that our Consciences

Consciences are hidden from Men, when our Souls lie open to God? *What could a Christian have spoken more to the purpose in this Case, than this Divine Pagan. And in the Beginning of the same WORK* says Seneca, What is it that we do? To what end is it to stand contriving, and to hide our selves? We are under a Guard, and there's no escaping from our Keeper. One Man may be parted from another, by Travel, Death, Sicknes: But there's no dividing us from our selves. 'Tis to no purpose to creep into a Corner, where no body shall see us. Ridiculous Madnes! Make it the Case that no Mortal Eye could find us out? He that has a Conscience gives Evidence against himself.

It

It is truly, and excellently spoken of Seneca, says
Lactantius, once again, Consider, says
 he, the Majesty, the Goodness,
 and the Venerable Mercies of
 the Almighty: A Friend that is
 alwayes at hand. What delight
 can it be to him, the slaughter
 of Innocent Creatures, or the
 Worship of Bloody Sacrifices?
 Let us purge our Minds, and
 lead Virtuous and Honest Lives:
 His Pleasure lies not in the Mag-
 nificence of Temples, made with
 Stone, but in the Piety and De-
 votion of Consecrated Hearts.

In the Book that Seneca wrote
 against Superstitions,
 treating of Images,
 says St. Austin, he

De Civ. Dei,
Lib. 6. Cap. 10.

[c]

Writes

Writes thus, They represent the Holy, the Immortal, and the Inviolable Gods, in the basest Matter; and without Life or Motion: In the Forms of Men, Beasts, Fishes; some, of mix'd Bodies; and those Figures they call Deities, which, if they were but animated, would affright a Man; and pass for Monsters. And then a little farther, treating of Natural Theology; after citing the Opinions of Philosophers, he supposes an Objection against himself; Some body will perhaps ask me: Would you have me then to believe the Heavens, and the Earth, to be Gods; and some of them above the Moon, and some below it? Shall I ever be brought to the Opinion of Plato, or of Seneca the Peripatetic:

tick: the one of which would have God to be without a Body, and the other without a Mind? To which he replies; And, Do you give more Credit then to the Dreams of T. Tatius, Romulus, and Hostilius, who caused, among other Deities, even Fear, and Paleness, to be worship'd? The vilest of Humane Affections; The one being the Motion of an affrighted Mind, and the other, not so much the Disease, as the Color of a disorder'd Body. Are these the Deities that you will rather put your Faith in, and place in the Heavens? And speaking afterward of their Abominable Customs. With what Liberty does he Write? One, says he, out of Zeal, makes himself an Eunuch; ano-

ther Lances his Armes : If this be the way to *Please* their Gods, What should a Man do if he had a Mind to *Anger* them? Or, if this be the way to please them, they do certainly deserve not to be Worshipp'd at all. What a Phrensy is this, to imagine, that the Gods can be delighted with such Cruelties, as even the worst of Men would make a Conscience to inflict? The most Barbarous and Notorious of Tyrants; some of them have perhaps done it Themselves, or Order'd the tearing of men to pieces by Others; but they never went so far, as to command any man to Torment himself. We have heard of those that have suffer'd Castration, to gratifie the Lust of their Imperious Masters : but
[: :] never

never any Man that was forc'd to Act it upon himself. They Murther themselves in their very Temples, and their Prayers are offer'd up in Blood. Whosoever shall but observe what they do, and what they suffer, will find it so mis-becoming an honest Man, so unworthy of a Freeman, and so inconsistent with the Action of a Man in his Wits, that he must conclude them all to be Mad; if it were not that there are so many of them; for only their Number is their Justification, and their Protection.

When he comes to reflect, sayes St. Augustin, upon those Passages, which he himself had seen in the Capitol,

Capitol. He censures them with Liberty, and Resolution: and no Man would believe that such things would be done, unless in Mockery, or Phrensy. What Lamentation is there in the Egyptian Sacrifices for the loss of Osiris? And then what joy for the finding of him again? which he makes himself sport with, for in truth it is all a Fiction: and yet those People that neither lost any thing, nor found any thing, must express their Sorrows, and their Rejoycings, to the highest degree. But there is only a Certain time, says he, for this Freake, and once in a Year people may be allow'd to be Mad. I came into the Capitol, says Seneca, where the several Deities had their several Servants, and

and Attendants, their Lictors, their Dressers, and all in Posture, and Action, as if they were executing their Offices: Some to hold the Glass, others to Comb out *Juno's* and *Minerva's* hair; one to tell *Jupiter* what a Clock it is; Some *Lasses* there are, that sit Gazing upon the Image, and ~~Phanſy~~ *Jupiter* has a kindness for them. All these things, *ſayes Seneca*, a while after, a Wise Man will observe for the Law's sake, more than for the Gods; and all this Rabble of Deities, which the Superstition of many Ages has gather'd together, we are in such manner to adore, as to consider the Worship to be rather Matter of Custome, than of Conscience. Where-

upon St. Augustine observes,
That this Illustrious Senator,
Worship'd what he Reprov'd;
Acted what he Dislik'd; and
Ador'd what he Condemn'd.

SENECA'S



SENECA'S

LIFE and DEATH.

IT has been an Ancient Custom, to Record the Actions, and the Writings of Eminent Men, with all their Circumstances; and it is but a Right that we owe to the Memory of our Famous Author. *Seneca* was, by Birth, a Spaniard of *Cordova* (a Roman Colony of great Fame and Antiquity) He was of the Family of *Annaeus*; of the Order of Knights; and the Father, *Lucius*

cins Annaeus Seneca, was distinguish'd from the Son, by the Name of the Orator. His Mothers Name was *Helvia*; a Woman of Excellent Qualities. His Father came to Rome in the time of *Augustus*; and his Wife and Children soon follow'd him, our *Seneca* yet being in his Infancy. There were three Brothers of them, and never a Sister. *Marcus Annaeus Noratus*, *Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, and *Lucius Annaeus Mela*. The first of these chang'd his Name for *Junius Gallio*, who adopted him; to him it was, that he Dedicated his Treatise of *Anger*, whom he calls *Noratus* too; and he also Dedicated his Discourse of a *Happy Life* to his Brother *Gallio*. The youngest Brother (*Annaeus Mela*) was

LIFE and DEATH. xxxv

was *Lucan's* Father. *Seneca* was about Twenty years of Age in the Fifth year of *Tiberius*, when the *Jews* were expell'd *Rome*. His Father train'd him up to *Rhetorick*, but his Genius led him rather to *Philosophy*, and he apply'd his Wit to *Morality*, and *Virtue*. He was a great Hearer of the Celebrated Men of those times; as *Attalus*, *Sotion*, *Papirius Fabianus*, (of whom he makes often mention) and he was much an Admirer also of *Demetrius* the *Cynique*, whose conversation he had afterwards in the Court, and both at home also, and abroad, for they often Travell'd together. His Father was not at all pleas'd with his humor of *Philosophy*, but forc'd him upon the *Law*, and for a while

while he Practis'd *Pleading*. After which, he would needs put him upon *Publick Employment*: and he came first to be *Quæstor*, and then *Prætor*; and some will have it that he was chosen *Consul*; but this is doubtful.

Seneca finding that he had ill Offices done him at Court, and that *Nero's* Favour began to cool; he went directly and resolutely to *Nero*, with an Offer to refund all that he had gotten. Which *Nero* would not receive; but, however, from that time, he chang'd his Course of Life; receiv'd few Visits; shun'd Company; went little abroad; still pretending to be kept at home, either by Indisposition, or by his Study. Being *Nero's* Tutor, and

LIFE and DEATH. xxxvii

and Governour, all things went well, so long as Nero follow'd his Counsel. His two Chief Favorites, were *Burrhus* and *Seneca*, who were both of them Excellent in their wayes. *Burrhus* in his care of Military Affairs, and severity of Discipline; *Seneca* for his Precepts, and Good Advice in the matter of Eloquence, and the Gentleness of an Honest Mind: assisting one another in that slippery Age of the Prince (sayes *Tacitus*) to invite him, by the Allowance of Lawful Pleasures, to the Love of Virtue. *Seneca* had two Wives; the Name of the first is not mention'd; his second was *Paulina*, whom he often speaks of with great Passion. By the former he had his Son *Marcus*.

In

In the first year of *Claudius* he was Banish'd into *Corsea*, when *Julia* the Daughter of *Germanicus* was accus'd by *Messalina* of Adultery, and Banish'd too: *Seneca* being charg'd as one of the Adulterers. After a matter of Eight years, or upwards, in Exile, he was call'd back, and as much in favor again as ever. His Estate was partly Patrimonial, but the greatest part of it was the Bounty of his Prince. His Gardens, Villa's, Lands, Possessions, and Incredible Sums of Money are agreed upon at all hands; which drew an Envy upon him. *Dio* reports him to have had 250000 £ Sterling at Interest in *Brittany* alone, which he call'd in, all at a Sum. The Court

LIFE and DEATH. xxxix

Court it self could not bring him to Flattery; and, for his Piety, Submission, and Virtue, the Practice of his whole Life witnesses for him. So soon, sayes he, as the Candle is

taken away; my ^{De Isa. xlv} Wife, that knowes ^{3.}

my Custome, lies still, without a word speaking: and then do I Recollect all that I have said, or done that day, and take my self to shrift. And why should I conceal, or reserve any thing, or make any Scruple of enquiring into my Errors, when I can say to my self, Do so no more, and, for this once, I'll forgive thee? And again, What can be more Pious, and Self-denying, than this Passage, in one of his Epistles? Be-

Ep. 96.

lieve

lieve me now, when I tell you the very bottom of my Soul: In all the Difficulties and Crosses of my life, this is my Consideration: Since it is God's Will, I do not only obey, but assent to't; nor do I comply, out of Necessity, but Inclination.

Here follows now, sayes Tacitus, the Death of

*Annot. Lib. 15.
Cap. 14.*

Seneca, to Nero's great satisfaction: Not so much for any pregnant Proof against him, that he was of Piso's Conspiracy; but Nero was resolv'd to do that by the Sword, which he could not Effect by Poyson. For, it is reported, that Nero had corrupted Cleonicus (a Freeman of Seneca's) to give his Master Poyson; which did not succeed: whether that the servant
had

LIFE and DEATH. xli

had discover'd it to his Master; or that Seneca by his own caution, and Jealousie, had avoided it; for he liv'd only upon a simple Diet, as the Fruits of the Earth; and his Drink was most commonly River-water.

Natalis, it seems, was sent upon a Visit to him (being indispos'd) with a Complaint, that he would not let Piso come at him; and Advising him to the Continuance of their Friendship, and Acquaintance, as formerly. To whom Seneca made Answer, That frequent Meetings, and Conferences betwixt them, could do neither of them any Good; but that he had a great Interest in Piso's welfare. Hereupon Granius Silvanus (a Captain of the Guard) was sent

[d]

to

to examine Seneca upon the Discourse that pass'd betwixt him, and Natalis, and to return his Answer. Seneca, either by Chance, or upon Purpose, came that day from Campania, to a Villa of his own, within four Miles of the City; and thither the Officer went the next Evening, and beset the Place. He found Seneca at Supper with his Wife Paulina, and two of his Friends; and gave him immediately an Account of his Commission. Seneca told him, that it was true, that Natalis had been with him, in Piso's Name, with a Complaint, that Piso could not be admitted to see him; and that he excus'd himself by reason of his want of health; and his desires to be quiet, and private; and that he had no reason to prefer another
Mans

Mans Wellfare before his own. Cæsar himself, he said, knew very well that he was not a Man of Complement, having receiv'd more Proofs of his Freedome, than of his Flattery. This Answer of Seneca's was deliver'd to Cæsar in the Presence of Poppæa and Tigellinus, the Intimate Confidants of this Barbarous Prince: and Nero ask'd him, Whether he could gather any thing from Seneca, as if he intended to make himself away? The Tribunes Answer was, That he did not find him one jot mov'd with the Message; but that he went on roundly with his Tale, and never so much as chang'd Countenance for the matter. Go back to him then, sayes Nero, and tell him, That he is Condemn'd to Die. Fabius

[d 2] Rusticus

Rusticus delivers it, that the Tribune did not return the same way he came, but went aside to Fenius (a Captain of that Name) and told him Cæsars Orders; asking his Advice, whether he should obey them, or not; who bad him by all means to do as he was Order'd. Which want of Resolution was fatal to them all; for Silvanus also, that was one of the Conspirators, assisted now to serve, and to increase those Crimes, which he had before plotted to revenge. And yet he did not think fit to appear himself in the business, but sent a Centurion to Seneca, to tell him his Doom. Seneca, without any surprise, or disorder, calls for his Will; which being refus'd him by the Officer, he turn'd to his Friends, and told them, That
[c b] since

LIFE and DEATH. xlv

since he was not permitted to requite them as they deserv'd, he was yet at liberty to bequeath them the thing of all others that he esteem'd the most, that is the Image of his Life: which should give them the Reputation both of Constancy, and Friendship, if they would but imitate it: exhorting them to a firmness of Mind; sometimes by Good Counsel; otherwhile by Reprehension, as the occasion requir'd. Where, sayes he, is all your Philosophy now? all your Premeditated Resolutions against the violences of Fortune? Is there any Man so Ignorant of Nero's Cruelty, as to expect, after the Murder of his Mother, and his Brother, that he should ever spare the Life of his Governor, and Tutor? After some General Expressi-
ons

ous to this Purpose; he took his Wife in his Armes, and having somewhat fortify'd her against the Present Calamity, he besought, and conjur'd her to moderate her Sorrows, and betake her self to the Contemplations, and Comforts of a Virtuous Life; which would be a fair, and an ample Consolation to her for the loss of her Husband. Paulina on the ether side, tells him her determination to bear him Company, and Wills for the Executioner to do his Office. Well, sayes Seneca, if after the sweetness of Life, as I have represented it to thee, thou hadst rather entertain an honorable Death, I shall not enay thy Example; consulting, at the same time, the Fate of the Person he lov'd, and his own tenderness, for fear of the Injuries that

LIFE and DEATH. xlvi

that might attend her when he was gone. Our Resolution sayes he, in this Generous Act, may be equal, but thine will be the greater Reputation. After this, the Veins of both their Armes were open'd, at one and the same stroke. Seneca did not bleed so freely, his Spirits being wasted with Age, and a thin Diet, so that he was forc'd to cut the Veins of his Thighs, and elsewhere, to hasten his dispatch. When he was far spent, and almost sinking under his Torments, he desir'd his Wife to remove into another Chamber, least the Agonyes of the one might work upon the Courage of the other. His Eloquence continu'd to the last, as appears by the Excellent Things he deliver'd at his Death; which being taken

in Writing from his own Mouth, and publish'd in his own words, I shall not presume to deliver them in any other. Nero, in the mean time, who had no particular Spite to Paulina, gave Orders to prevent her Death, for fear His Cruelty should grow more, and more Insupportable, and Odious. Whereupon the Soldiers gave all freedom, and encouragement to her Servants, to Bind up her Wounds, and stop the Blood, which they did accordingly, but whether she was sensible of it or not, is a Question: For, among the Common People, who are apt to judge the worst, there were some of Opinion, that as long as she despair'd of Nero's Mercy, she seem'd to Court the Glory of dying with her Husband
for

for Company, but that upon the
 likelihood of better Quarter, she
 was prevail'd upon to out-live
 him; And so, for some years, she
 did survive him, with all Piety
 and Respect to his Memory: but
 so miserably pale and wan, that
 every body might Read the Loss of
 her Blood, and Spirits, in her ve-
 ry Countenance.

Seneca finding his Death slow,
 and lingering, desires Statius An-
 næus (his old Friend, and Phy-
 sician) to give him a Dose of
 Poyson, which he had provided
 before-hand, being the same Pre-
 paration which was appointed for
 Capital Offenders in Athens. This
 was brought him, and he drank it
 up, but to little purpose, for his
 Body

Body was already chill'd, and bound up against the force of it. He went at last into a hot Bath, and sprinkling some of his servants that were next him; This, sayes he, is an Oblation to Jupiter the Deliverer. The fume of the Bath soon dispatch'd him, and his Body was Burnt, without any Funeral solemnity, as he had directed in his Testament: though this Will of his was made in the height of his Prosperity, and Power, There was a Rumor that Subrius Flavius, in a Private consultation with the Centurions, had taken up this following Resolution, (and that Seneca himself was no stranger to it) that is to say, that after Nero should have been slain by the help of Piso, Piso himself should

LIFE and DEATH. **li**

*should have been kill'd too : and
the Empire deliver'd up to Sene-
ca ; as one that well deserv'd it ,
for his Integrity and Virtue.*

BOOKS

ii LIFE and DEATH.

should have been killed too: and
the Empire deliver'd up to Rome:
as: as one that well deserv'd it
for his Integrity and Virtue.

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SEN E C A

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SENECA

O F

Benefits.

CHAP. I.

Of Benefits in General.

T is perhaps, one of the most pernicious Errors of a Rash, and Inconsiderate Life; the Common Ignorance of the World in the Matter of exchanging *Benefits*. And this arises from a Mistake; partly, in the Person that we would Oblige; and partly, in the thing it self. To begin with the Latter; *A Benefit* is a good Office, done with Intention; and Judgment: that is

B

to

to say, with a due regard to all the Circumstances, of *What; How; Why; When; Where; to whom; how much;* and the like. Or otherwise; *It is a Voluntary, and Benevolent Action, that delights the Giver, in the Comfort it brings to the Receiver.* It will be hard to draw this Subject, either into Method, or Compass; the one, because of the infinite variety, and Complication of Cases; the other, by reason of the large Extent of it: For the whole Business (almost) of Mankind in Society, falls under this Head: The Duties of Kings and Subjects; Husbands, and Wives; Parents, and Children; Masters, and Servants; Natives, and Strangers; High, and Low; Rich, and Poor; Strong, and Weak; Friends, and Enemies. The very Meditation of it breeds good Blood, and generous Thoughts; and instructs us in all the Parts of Honor, Humanity, Friendship, Piety, Gratitude, Prudence, and Justice. In short; the Art, and Skill of conferring Benefits, is, of all Humane Duties, the most absolutely necessary
to

Chap. I. OF BENEFITS.

3

to the well-Being; both of Reasonable Nature, and of every Individual; as the very Ciment of all Communities, and the Blessing of Particulars. He that does good to another Man; does good also to himself; not only in the Consequence, but even in the very Act of doing it; for the Conscience of well-doing is an ample Reward.

OF Benefits in General, there are several sorts; As *a Necessary, Profitable,*

table, and *Delightful.* Some things there are, without which

a Benefits Necessary, Profitable, and Delightful.

we *Cannot* Live; Others, without which we *Ought not* to live; and some again, without which we *Will not* live. In the first Rank are those, which deliver us from capital Dangers, or Apprehensions of Death: And the favour is rated according to the hazard; for the greater the Extremity, the greater seems the Obligation. The next is a Case wherein we may indeed Live, but we had better Dye: As in the Question of Liberty, Modesty, and a good Conscience. In the third place,

follow those things which Custome,
Use, Affinity, and Acquaintance have
made dear to us ; As Husbands, Wives,
Children, Friends, &c. Which an ho-
nest Man will Preserve at his utmost Pe-
ril : Of things Profitable there's a
large Field ; as Mony, Honor, &c. to
which might be added Matters of Su-
perfluity, and Pleasure : But, we shall
open a way to the Circumstances of a
Benefit, by some previous, and more
General deliberations upon the thing
it self.

Chap. II. OF BENEFITS.

CHAP. II.

Several Sorts of Benefits.

WE shall divide *Benefits* into *Absolute*, and *Vulgar*; the One, appertaining to Good Life; the Other, is only Matter of Commerce. The former are the more Excellent, because they can never be made void: whereas all Material Benefits are tossed back, and forward, and change their Master. There are some Offices that look like Benefits, but are only desirable Conveniencies; as Wealth, Title, &c. and These a Wicked Man may receive from a Good, or a Good Man, from an Evil. Others again, that bear the face of Injuries, which are only Benefits ill-taken; as Cutting, Lancing, Burning, under the hand of a Surgeon. The greatest Benefits of all, are those of good Education, which we receive from our Parents, either in the State of Ignorance, or

*b Benefits Absolute
and Vulgar.*

Perverseness; as their Care and Tenderness in our Infancy; Their Discipline in our Childhood; to keep us to our duties by fear; and, if fair means will not do, their Proceeding afterward to severity, and Punishment, without which we should never have come to good. There are Matters of great value many times, that are but of small price; as Instructions from a Tutor; Medicines from a Physician, &c. And there are small matters again which are of great consideration to us: the Gift may be small, and the consequence great, as a Cup of cold Water in a time of need, may save a Mans Life; some things are of great Moment to the Giver; others to the Receiver; One Man gives me a House; another snatches me out, when 'tis falling upon my head; One gives me an Estate; Another takes me out of the Fire; or casts me out a Rope when I am sinking: Some good Offices we do to Friends; Others, to Strangers; but, those are the noblest that we do without Predefect. There is an Obligation of Bounty; and an Obligation

Chap. II. OF BENEFITS.

7

Obligation of Charity: This, in case of Necessity; and That, in point of Convenience. Some Benefits are Common; Others are Personal: as if a Prince (out of pure Grace) grant a Privilege to a City; the Obligation lies upon the Community, and only upon every Individual as a Part of the whole; but if it be done particularly for my sake, then am I singly the Debtor for't. The cherishing of Strangers is one of the duties of Hospitality; and exercises it self in the Relief, and Protection of the Distressed. There are Benefits of good Counsel, Reputation, Life, Fortune, Liberty, Health; nay, and of Superfluity, and Pleasure. One Man obliges me out of his Pocket: Another gives me Matter of Ornament, or Curiosity: a Third, Consolation. To say nothing of Negative Benefits; for there are, that reckon it an Obligation if they do a Body no hurt; and place it to Accompt, as if they sav'd a Man, when they do not undo him. To shut up all in one word; as Benevolence is the most sociable of all Virtues, so is it of

the largest Extent; for, there is not any Man either so great, or so little, but he is yet capable of giving, and of receiving Benefits.

CHAP. III.

Chap. III. Of BENEFITS.

CHAP. III.

*A Son may Oblige his Father; and,
a Servant his Master.*

THE Question is (in the first Place) Whether it may not be possible for a Father to owe more to a Son, in other respects, than the Son^a owes to his Father for his Being? That many Sons are both Greater, and Better than their Fathers, there is no Question: as there are many other things that derive their Beings from others, which yet are far greater than their Original. Is not the Tree larger than the Seed? The River, than the Fountain? The Foundation of all things lies hid, and the Superstructure obscures it. If I owe all to my Father, because he gave me Life, I may owe as much to a Physician that sav'd his Life; for, if my Father had not been Cur'd, I had never been Begotten: Or, if I stand indebted

*a How far a Son
may Oblige a Fa-
ther.*

ed for all that I am to my Beginning; my Acknowledgment must run back to the very Original of all Humane Beings. My Father gave me the Benefit of Life, which he had never done, if his Father had not first given it to him. He gave me Life, not knowing to whom, and when I was in a Condition neither to feel Death, nor to fear it. That's the great Benefit, to give Life to one that knows how to use it; and that is capable of the Apprehension of Death. 'Tis true, that without a Father, I could never have had a Being; and so without a Nurse that Being had never been improv'd; but I do not therefore owe my Virtue either to my Nativity, or to her that gave me Suck. The generation of me was the least part of the Benefit: For to Live, is common with Brutes; but, to Live well is the main business; and that Virtue is all my own, saving what I drew from my Education. It does not follow that the first Benefit must be the greatest, because without the first, the greatest could never have been. The Father

Chap. III. Of BENEFITS. 11

ther gives Life to the Son, but once; but if the Son saves the Fathers Life often, though he do but his duty, it is yet a greater Benefit. And again, the Benefit that a Man receives is the greater, the more he needs it; but, the Living has more need of Life, than he that is not yet born: So that the Father receives a greater Benefit in the Continuance of his Life, than the Son in the Beginning of it. What if a Son deliver his Father from the Rack; or, which is more, lay himself down in his place? The giving of him a Being, was but the Office of a Father; a simple Act; a Benefit given at a venture; beside that he had a Participant in it, and a regard to his Family. He gave only a single Life, and he receiv'd a happy one. My Mother brought me into the World Naked, expos'd, and void of Reason; but, my Reputation, and my Fortune, are advanc'd by my Virtue. *Scipio* (as yet in his Minority) rescu'd his Father in a Battel with *Hannibal*; and afterward from the Practices, and Prosecution of a Power-
ful

ful Faction; covering him with Consular Honors, and the Spoyles of Publick Enemies. He made himself as Eminent for his Moderation, as for his Piety, and Military Knowledge: He was the Defender, and the Establisher of his Country; He left the Empire without a Competitor; and made himself as well the Ornament of *Rome*, as the Security of it: and, Did not *Scipio*, in all this, more than requite his Father barely for Begetting of him? Whether did *Anchises* more for *Aeneas*, in dandling the Child in his Armes, or *Aeneas* for his Father, when he carry'd him upon his Back through the Flames of *Troy*, and made his Name famous to future Ages, among the Founders of the *Roman Empire*? *T. Manlius* was the Son of a Sour, and Imperious Father, who banish'd him his House as a Blockhead, and a scandal to the Family: This *Manlius*, hearing that his Fathers Life was in Question, and a day set for his Tryal, went to the Tribune that was concern'd in the Cause, and discours'd him about it: the Tribune told him the appointed

Chap. III. OF BENEFITS. 13

appointed time, and withal (as an Obligation upon the young Man) that his Cruelty to his Son would be part of his Accusation: *Manlius*, upon this, takes the Tribune aside, and presenting a Ponyard to his breast, *Swear*, sayes he, *that you will let this Cause fall, or you shall have this Dagger in the heart of you; and now 'tis at your choise, which way you will deliver my Father.* The Tribune Swore, and kept his Word; and made a fair Report of the whole matter to the Council. He that makes himself Famous by his Eloquence, Justice, or Armes, illustrates his Extraction, let it be never so mean; and gives inestimable Reputation to his Parents. We should never have heard of *Sophroniscus*, but for his Son *Socrates*; nor of *Aristo*, and *Gryllus*, if it had not been for *Xenophon*, and *Plato*.

THIS is not to discountenance the Veneration we owe to Parents; nor to make Children the worse, but the better; and to stir up generous Emulations: for, in Contests of good Offices,
both

both Parts are happy; as well the vanquish'd, as those that overcome. It is the only honorable dispute that can arrive betwixt a Father and a Son, which of the two shall have the better of the other in the Point of Benefits.

I N the Question betwixt a Master, and a Servant; we must distinguish be-

*b A Servant may
oblige his Ma-
ster.*

twixt *b* Benefits, Duties, and Actions Ministerial; By *Benefits* we understand those good Offices that we receive from

Strangers, which are voluntary, and may be forborn without blame. *Du-*

ties are the Parts of a Son, and Wife; and incumbent upon Kindred, and Relations. *Offices Ministerial* belong to

the Part of a Servant. Now, since it is

the *Mind*, and not the *Condition* of the Person, that Prints the Value upon the

Benefit, a Servant may oblige his Master, and so may a Subject his Sovereign,

or a Common Soldier his General, by doing more than he is expressly bound

to do. Some things there are, which the Law neither commands, nor forbids;

and

Chap. III. Of BENEFITS. 15

and here the Servant is free. It would be very hard for a Servant to be chastiz'd for doing less than his duty, and not thank'd for't when he does more. His Body, 'tis true, is his Masters, but his Mind is his own: and there are many Commands which a Servant ought no more to obey, than a Master to impose. There is no Man so great, but he may both need the help, and service, and stand in fear of the Power and Unkindness, even of the meanest of Mortals. One Servant Kills his Master, another Saves him; nay preserves his Masters Life, perhaps with the loss of his own. He exposes himself to Torment and Death; he stands firm against all threats and flatteries: which is not only a Benefit in a Servant, but much the greater for his so being.

WHEN *Domitius* was besieg'd in *Confinium*, and the Place brought to great extremity; he pressed his servant so earnestly to Poyson him, that at last he was prevail'd upon to give him a Potion: which, it seems, was an innocent

cent Opiate, and *Domitius* out-liv'd it: *Cesar* took the Town; and gave *Domitius* his Life; but it was his Servant that gave it him first.

THERE was another Town besieg'd; and, when it was upon the last pinch, two Servants made their escape, and went over to the Enemy: Upon the *Romans* entring the Town, and in the heat of the Soldiers fury, these two Fellows ran directly home, took their Mistress out of her house, and drave her before them, telling every body how barbarously she had us'd them formerly; and that they would now have their Revenge: when they had her without the Gates, they kept her close till the danger was over; by which means, they gave their Mistress her Life, and she gave them their Freedom. This was not the Action of a Servile Mind; to do so Glorious a thing, under an appearance of so great a Villany; for, if they had not pass'd for Deserters, and Parricides, they could not have gain'd their End.

WITH

WITH one Instance more (and that a very brave one) I shall conclude this Chapter.

IN the Civil Wars of *Rome*, a Party coming to search for a Person of Quality that was proscrib'd, a Servant put on his Masters Cloths, and deliver'd himself up to the Soldiers, as the Master of the House; he was taken into Custody, and put to death, without discovering the Mistake. What could be more glorious, than for a Servant to dye for his Master? in that Age, when there were not many Servants that would not betray their Masters? So generous a tenderness in a Publick Cruelty; So invincible a Faith in a General Corruption; What could be more glorious, I say, than so exalted a Virtue, as rather to chuse death for the Reward of his Fidelity, than the greatest advantages he might otherwise have had for the violation of it?

CHAP. IV.

*It is the Intention, not the Matter,
that makes the Benefit.*

THE Good will of the Benefactor is the Fountain of all Benefits: nay, it is the Benefit it self; or, at least the Stamp that makes it valuable, and current. Some there are, I know, that take the Matter for the Benefit; and taxe the Obligation by weight and measure. When any thing is given them, they presently cast it up; *What may such a House be worth? Such an Office? Such an Estate?* As if that were the Benefit, which is only the Sign, and Mark of it: For, the Obligation rests in the Mind, not in the Matter; And, all those Advantages which we see, handle, or hold in actual possession by the Courtesie of another, are but several Modes, or Wayes of Explaining, and putting the Good Will in Execution. There needs no great subtilty, to prove, that

Chap. IV. OF BENEFITS. 19

that both Benefits and Injuries receive their value from the Intention; when even Brutes themselves are able to decide this Question. Tread upon a Dog by chance, or put him to pain upon the dressing of a Wound; the one, he passes by as an Accident; and the other, in his fashion, he acknowledges as a Kindness; but, offer to strike at him, though you do him no hurt at all, he flies yet in the face of you, even for the Mischief that you barely meant him.

IT is further to be observ'd; that all ^a Benefits are good; and (like the distributions of Providence) made up of Wisdom and Bounty: whereas the Gift it self is neither good, nor bad, but may indifferently be apply'd, either to the one, or to the other. The Benefit is Immortal, the Gift Perishable: For, the Benefit it self continues, when we have no longer, either the Use, or the Matter of it. He that is dead, was alive; He that has lost his Eyes, did see; and,

a All Benefits are good.

whatsoever is done, cannot be rendred undone. My Friend (for Instance) is taken by Pyrates; I redeem him; and, after that, he falls into other Pyrates hands: his Obligation to me is the same still, as if he had preserv'd his Freedom. And so, if I save a Man from any one Misfortune, and he falls into another; if I give him a Sum of Money, which is afterward taken away by Thieves; it comes to the same Case. Fortune may deprive us of the Matter of a Benefit, but the Benefit it self remains inviolable. If the Benefit resided in the Matter, that which is good for one Man, would be so for another; whereas many times the very same thing given to several Persons, works contrary effects; even to the difference of Life, or Death; and, that which is one bodies Cure, proves another bodies Poison. Beside that the Timing of it alters the value; and, a Crust of Bread upon a pinch, is a greater Present than an Imperial Crown. What is more Familiar, than, in a Battel, to shoot at an Enemy, and kill a Friend? Or, instead
of

Chap. IV. Of BENEFITS.

21

of a Friend, to save an Enemy? But yet this disappointment in the Event, does not at all operate upon the Intention. What if a Man cures me of a Wen, with a stroke that was design'd to cut off my head? Or, with a Malicious blow upon my Stomach, breaks an Imposthume? or, What if he save my Life, with a Draught that was prepar'd to Poyson me? The Providence of the Issue does not at all discharge the Obliguity of the Intent. And, the same Reason holds good even in Religion it self: It is not the Incense, or the Offering that is acceptable to God, but the Purity, and Devotion of the Worshipper. Neither is the bare Will, without Action, sufficient; that is, where we have the Means of Acting; for, in that Case, it signifies as little to *wish* well, without *well-doing*, as to *do* good without *willing* it. There must be Effect, as well as Intention, to make me owe a Benefit; but, to will against it, does wholly discharge it. In fine, the Conscience alone is the Judge, both of Benefits and Injuries.

*b The Good Will
must be accompa-
nyed with judg-
ment.*

IT does not follow now, because the Benefit rests in the ^b Good Will, that therefore the Good Will should be alwayes a Benefit; for, if it be not accompany'd with Government, and Discretion, those Offices which we call Benefits, are but the Works of Passion, or of Chance; and, many times, the greatest of all Injuries. One Man does me good by Mistake; another, Ignorantly; a third upon force; but, none of these Cases do I take to be an Obligation, for they were neither directed to me, nor was there any kindness of Intention: We do not thank the Seas for the Advantages we receive by Navigation; or the Rivers, for supplying us with Fish, and flowing of our Grounds; we do not thank the Trees either for their Fruits, or Shades; or the Winds for a fair Gale: And, What's the difference betwixt a reasonable Creature, that does not know, and an Inanimate, that cannot? A good Horse saves one Man's Life; a good Sute

Chap. IV. OF BENEFITS.

23

Sute of *Armes* Another's; and, a *Man* perhaps, that never intended it, saves a Third. Where's the difference now betwixt the Obligation of the one, and of the other? A Man falls into a River, and the fright cures him of an Ague; we may call this a kind of lucky Mischance, but not a Remedy. And so it is with the Good we receive, either without or beside, or contrary to Intention. It is the Mind, and not the Event, that distinguishes a Benefit from an Injury.

CHAP. V.

*There must be Judgment in a Benefit,
as well as Matter, and Intention;
and especially in the Choice of the
Person.*

AS it is the *Will*, that Designs the Benefit; and the *Matter*, that Conveys it: So it is the *Judgment* that perfects it: which depends upon so many Critical Niceties, that the least Error, either in the Person, the Matter, the Manner, the Quality, the Quantity, the Time, or the Place, spoiles all.

THE Consideration of the *Person* is a Main Point; for, we are to give by choice, and not by hazard. My Inclination bids me oblige one Man; I am bound in Duty, and Justice, to serve another; here 'tis Charity, there 'tis Pitty; and, elsewhere perhaps Encouragement.

*a The Choice of
the Person is a
Main Point.*

There

There are some that want, to whom I would not give; because, if I did, they would want still. To one Man I would barely offer a Benefit; but, I would press it upon another. To say the truth, we do not employ any Money to more profit, than that which we bestow: and 'tis not to our Friends, our Acquaintances, or Countrymen; nor to this, or that Condition of Men, that we are to restrain our Bounties; but, wheresoever there is a Man, there is a Place, and Occasion for a Benefit. We give to some that are good already; to others, in hope to make them so; but, we must do all with discretion; for, we are as answerable for what we give; as for what we receive: Nay, the Misplacing of a Benefit is worse, than the not Receiving of it: For, the one is another Mans fault; but, the other is mine. The Error of the Giver does oft-times excuse the Ingratitude of the Receiver; for, a Favour ill-plac'd is rather a Profusion, than a Benefit. It is the most shameful of Losses, an In-

con-

confiderate bounty. I will chuse a Man of Integrity, Syncere, Confiderate, Graceful, Temperate, Well-natur'd; neither Covetous, nor Sordid. And, when I have oblig'd such a Man, though not worth a Groat in the World, I have gain'd my end. If we give, only to receive, we lose the fairest objects for our Charity; the Absent, the Sick, the Captive, and the Needy. When we oblige those that can never pay us again in kind; as a Stranger upon his last Farewell; or a Necessitous Person upon his Death-bed, we make Providence our Debtor; and rejoyce in the Conscience even of a Fruitless Benefit. So long as we are affected with Passions, and distracted with hopes, and fears; and (the most unmanly of Vices) with our Pleasures, we are incompetent Judges where to place our Bounties. But, when Death presents it self, and that we come to our Last Will and Testament, we leave our Fortunes to the most worthy. He that gives nothing but in hopes

hopes of receiving, must dye Intestate. It is the Honesty of another Mans Mind that moves the Kindness of Mine; and I would sooner oblige a Grateful Man, than an Ungrateful: but, this shall not hinder me from doing good also to a Person that is known to be Ungrateful: Only with this difference, that I will serve the one in all Extremities with my life, and fortune; and the other, no further than stands with my Convenience. But, What shall I do, you'll say, to know whether a Man will be grateful, or no? I will follow Probability, and hope the best. He that Sows, is not sure to Reap; nor the Seaman to reach his Port; nor the Soldier to win the Field. He that VVeds is not sure his VVife shall be honest; or, his Children dutiful; but, Shall we therefore neither Sow, Sayl, bear Armes, nor Marry? Nay, if I knew a Man to be incurably thankless, I would yet be so kind as to put him into his Way, or let him Light a Candle, or Draw Water at my Well, which
may

may stand him perhaps in great stead, and yet not be reckon'd as a Benefit from me; for I do it carelessly, and not for his sake, but my own; as an Office of Humanity, without any Choice, or Kindness.

CHAP. VI.

The Matter of Obligations, with its Circumstances.

NEXT to the Choice of the *Person*, follows that of the *Matter*; wherein a regard must be had to Time, Place, Proportion, Quality; and, to the very Nicks of Opportunity, and Humour. One Man values his Peace above his Honour; Another, his Honour above his Safety; and, not a few there are, that (provided they may save their Bodies) never care what becomes of their Souls. So that Good Offices depend much upon Construction. Some take themselves to be oblig'd, when they are not, Others will not believe it, when they are; and some again take Obligations, and Injuries, the one, for the other.

FOR

FOR our better direction, let it be noted, *That a Benefit is a Common Tye betwixt the Giver, and the Receiver, with a respect to both.* Wherefore, it must be accommodate to the

a A Benefit is a Common Tye betwixt Giver and Receiver.

Rules of Discretion; for all things have their Bounds, and Measures, and so must Liberality among the rest; that it be neither too much for the One, nor too little for the Other; the Excess being every jot as bad as the Defect. *Alexander* bestow'd a City upon one of his Favourites; who modestly excusing himself, *That it was too much for him to receive: Well; But, sayes Alexander, it is not too much for me to give:* a haughty, certainly, and an imprudent Speech; for, that which was not fit for the one to Take, could not be fit for the other to Give. It passes in the World for Greatness of Mind, to be perpetually giving, and loading of People with Bounties: but, 'tis one thing to know how to give, and another thing not to know how to keep.

Give

Chap. VI. Of BENEFITS.

31

Give me a heart that's easie and open, but I'll have no holes in't; let it be bountiful with Judgment, but I'll have nothing run out of it I know not how. How much greater was he that refus'd the City, than the other that offer'd it? Some men throw away their Money as if they were Angry with it, which is the Error commonly of weak Minds, and large Fortunes. No Man esteemes of any thing that comes to him by Chance; but, when 'tis Govern'd by Reason, it brings Credit both to the Giver, and Receiver; whereas those favours are, in some sort, scandalous, that make a Man asham'd of his Patron.

IT is a Matter of great Prudence, for the Benefactor to Suit the Benefit to the Condition of the Receiver; who must be, either his Superiour, his Inferiour, or his Equal, and that which would be the highest Obligation imaginable to the one, would, perhaps, be as great a Mockery, and Affront to the other:

*b A Benefit must
be suited to the
Condition of the
Receiver.*

other: As a Plate of broken Meat (for the Purpose) to a Rich Man, were an Indignity, which to a Poor Man is a Charity. The Benefits of Princes, and of Great Men, are Honours, Offices, Moneys, Profitable Commissions, Countenance, and Protection; The Poor Man has nothing to Present, but Good-Will, Good Advice, Faith, Industry, the Service, and Hazard of his Person, an early Apple peradventure, or some other cheap Curiosity: Equals indeed may correspond in Kind; but, whatsoever the Present be, or to whomsoever we offer it, this General Rule must be observ'd, That we alwayes design the good, and satisfaction of the Receiver; and, never grant any thing to his detriment. 'Tis not for a man to say, I was overcome by Importunity, for when the Fever is off, we detest the man that was prevail'd upon to our destruction. I will no more undoe a man with his Will, then forbear saving him against it. It is a Benefit in some Cases to Grant, and in others to deny; So that we

are

Chap. VI. OF BENEFITS. 33

are rather to consider the Advantage, than the Desire of the Petitioner. For, we may, in a Passion, earnestly beg for (and take it ill to be deny'd too) that very thing, which, upon second thoughts, we may come to curse, as the occasion of a most Pernicious Bounty. Never give any thing that shall turn to Mischief, Infamy, or Shame. I will consider another Mans want, or safety; but so, as not to forget my own; Unless in the case of a very excellent Person, and then I shall not much heed what becomes of my self. There's no giving of Water to a Man in a Fever; or putting of a Sword into a Mad-Mans hands; He that lends a Man Money to carry him to a Bawdy-house, or a Weapon for his Revenge, makes himself a Partaker of his Crime.

HE that would make an acceptable Present, will pitch upon something that is desir'd, sought for, and hard to be found; that which he sees no where else, and which few have; or at least not in that place,

D or

or season; something that may be alwayes in his Eye, and mind him of the Benefactor. If it be lasting and durable, so much the better; as Plate, rather than Money; Statues, than Apparel; for it will serve as a Monitor, to mind the Receiver of the Obligation, which the Presenter cannot so handsomely do. However, let it not be improper, as Armes to a Woman; Books to a Clown; Toyes to a Philosopher: I will not *Give* to any Man that which he cannot receive; as if I threw a Ball to a man without hands; but I will make a *Return*, though he cannot receive it; for, my business is not to oblige him, but to free my self: Nor any thing that may reproach a man of his Vice, or Infirmary: as false Dice to a Cheat; Spectacles to a man that's blind. Let it not be unseasonable, neither: as a furr'd Gown in Summer; an *Umbrella* in Winter. It enhances the value of the Present, if it was never given to him by any body else, nor by me to any other; for, that which we give to every body, is wellcome to no body.

The

The Particularity does much, but yet the same thing may receive a different Estimate from several Persons; for, there are wayes of marking, and recommending it in such a manner, that if the same *good Office* be done to twenty people, every one of them shall reckon himself peculiarly oblig'd: as a cunning Whore, if she has a thousand Sweet-hearts, will perswade every one of them, that she loves him best. But, this is rather the Artifice of Conversation, than the virtue of it.

THE Citizens of *Megara* sent Embassadors to ^d *Alexander* in the Height of his Glory, to offer him, as a Complement, the Freedom of their City. Upon *Alexander's* smiling at the Proposal, they told him, That it was a Present which they had never made, but to *Hercules*, and Himself: Whereupon, *Alexander* treated them kindly, and accepted of it; not for the Presenters sakes, but because they had joyn'd him with *Hercules*; how unreasonably soever: For,

D 2 *Hercules*

Let the Present be singular.

Hercules Conquer'd nothing for himself, but made it his business to vindicate, and to protect the miserable, without any private Interest, or Design: But this intemperate young man (whose Virtue was nothing else but a successful Temerity) was train'd up from his youth in the Trade of violence: The Common Enemy of mankind; as well of his Friends, as of his Foes; and one that valu'd himself upon being terrible to all Mortals: never considering, that the dullest of Creatures are as dangerous, and as dreadful, as the fiercest; for, the poyson of a Toad, or the Tooth of a Snake, will do a Man's business as soon as the paw of a Tiger.

CHAP. VII.

The Manner of Obliging.

THERE is not any Benefit so glorious in it self, but it may yet be exceedingly sweetned, and improv'd by the *Manner* of conferring it. The Virtue, I know, rests in the *Intent*; the Profit, in the Judicious application of the *Matter*; but, the Beauty, and Ornament of an Obligation lies in the *Manner* of it; and it is then Perfect, when the dignity of the Office is accompany'd with all the Charms, and Delicacies, of Humanity, good Nature, and Address: and with Dispatch too; for, he that puts a Man off from time to time, was never right at heart.

IN the first place, whatsoever we give, let us do it *frankly*; A kind Benefactor makes a Man *as Give Frankly.* happy as *soon* as he can, and as *much* as he can. There should be no *delay* in a Benefit, but the Modesty of

the Receiver. If we cannot foresee the Request, let us however immediately grant it, and by no means suffer the Repeating of it. It is so grievous a thing, to say, *I BEG*; the very word puts a Man out of Countenance: and 'tis a double Kindness to do the thing, and save an honest man the Confusion of a Blush. It comes too late, that comes for the Asking; for, nothing costs us so dear, as that which we purchase with our Prayers: It is all we give, even for Heaven it self; and even there too, where our Petitions are at the fayrest, we chuse rather to present them in Secret Ejaculations, than by word of Mouth. That is the lasting, and the acceptable Benefit, that meets the Receiver half way. The Rule is, we are to Give, as we would Receive; *cheerfully, quickly*, and without hesitation; for there's no Grace in a Benefit that sticks to the Fingers. Nay, if there should be occasion for delay, let us, however, not seem to deliberate: for *demurring* is next dore to *denying*; and, so long as
we

we suspend, so long are we unwilling. It is a Court-humour, to keep People upon the Tenters; their Injuries are quick, and sudden, but their Benefits are slow. Great Ministers love to wrack men with Attendance; and account it an Ostentation of their Power to hold their Suitours in hand, and to have many Witnesses of their Interest. A Benefit should be made acceptable by all possible means, even to the end that the Receiver, who is never to forget it, may bear it in his Mind with satisfaction. There must be no mixture of Sourness, Severity, Contumely, or Reproof, with our Obligations; nay, in case there should be any occasion for so much as an Admonition, let it be referr'd to another time. We are a great deal apter to remember Injuries, than Benefits; and, 'tis enough to forgive an Obligation, that has the Nature of an Offence.

THERE are some that spoil a good Office ^b after it is done; and ^b Give ^{Cbear-} others, in the very instant of ^{fully.} doing

doing it. There must be so much Entreaty and Importunity: nay, if we do but suspect a Petitioner, we put on a sour face; look another way; pretend Hastē, Company, Business; talk of other Matters, and keep him off with Artificial Delays, let his Necessities be never so pressing; and when we are put to't at last, it comes so hard from us, that 'tis rather Extorted, than Obtain'd; and not so properly the giving of a Bounty, as the quitting of a Mans hold upon the Tugg, when another is too strong for him: so that this is but doing one kindness for mee, and another for himself; He gives for his own Quiet, after he has tormented me with difficulties, and delays. The *Manner of Saying*, or of *Doing* any thing, goes a great way in the value of the thing it self. It was well said of him, that call'd a good Office that was done harshly, and with an ill-will, *A Stony Piece of Bread*; 'tis necessary for him that is hungry, to receive it; but, it almost chokes a Man in the going down. There must be no Pride, Arrogance

Chap. VII. Of BENEFITS. 41

Arrogance of looks, or tumour of Words in the bestowing of Benefits; no Insolence of Behaviour, but a Modesty of Mind, and a diligent care to catch at occasions, and prevent Necessities. A Pause, an Unkind Tone, Word, Look, or Action, destroyes the Grace of a Curtesie. It corrupts a Bounty when it is accompany'd with State, Haughtiness, and Elation of Mind in the giving of it. Some have the Trick of shifiting off a Suitor with a point of Wit, or a Cavil. As in the Case of the *Cynick* that beg'd a Talent of *Antigonus*; *That's too much*, sayes he, *for a Cynick to ask*; and when he fell to a Penny, *That's too little*, sayes he, *for a Prince to give*. He might have found a way to have compounded this Controversie, by giving him a Penny, as to a *Cynique*; and a Talent, as from a Prince. Whatsoever we bestow, let it be done with a Frank and Chearful Countenance; a Man must not give with his Hand, and deny with his Looks; he that gives quickly, gives willingly.

We

*c Accompany Good
Deeds with good
Words.*

WE are likewise to ^caccompany Good Deeds with Good Words; and say (for the Purpose) *Why should you make such a Matter of this? Why did not you come to me sooner? Why would you make use of any body else? I take it ill that you should bring me a Recommendation; Pray let there be no more of this; but when you have occasion hereafter, come to me upon your own account. That's the glorious Bounty, when the Receiver can say to himself, What a blessed day has this been to me! never was any thing done so generously, so tenderly, with so good a Grace. What is it I would not do to serve this Man? a thousand times as much another way could not have given me this satisfaction.* In such a Case, let the Benefit be never so considerable, the manner of conferring it is yet the noblest part. Where there is harshness of Language, Countenance, or Behaviour, a Man had better be without it. A flat denial is infinitely before a vexatious delay; as a quick Death is a Mercy, compar'd with a lingering Torment,

Torment. But, to be put to Waytings, and Intercessions, after a Promise is past, is a Cruelty Intolerable. 'Tis troublesome to stay long for a Benefit, let it be never so great; and he that holds me needlessly in pain, loses two precious things, Time, and the Proof of Friendship. Nay, the very hint of a Mans wants comes many times too late. *If I had Money, said Socrates, I would buy me a Cloak.* They that knew he wanted one, should have prevented the very Intimation of that want. It is not the Value of the Present, but the Benevolence of the Mind, that we are to consider. *He gave me but a little; but, it was generously, and frankly done; it was a little, out of a little: he gave me it without asking; he prest it upon me; he watch'd the opportunity of doing it; and took it as an Obligation upon himself.* On the other side, many Benefits are great in shew, but little, or nothing perhaps in effect; when they come hard, slow, or at unawares. That which is given with Pride and Osten-

tation, is rather an Ambition, than a Bounty.

SOME Favours are to be conferr'd in
Publick; others in *Private*.

*d Some Favours in
 Publick, others in
 Private.*

In *Publick*, the rewards of great Actions; as Honours, Charges, or whatsoever else gives a Man Reputation in the World; but, the good Offices we do for a Man in Want, Distress, or under Reproach; these should be known only to those that have the Benefit of them. Nay, not to them neither, if we can handsomely conceal it from whence the favour came: For the Secrecy in many Cases, is a main part of the Benefit. There was a good Man that had a Friend, who was both Poor, and Sick, and ashamed to own his Condition: He privately convey'd a Bag of Money under his Pillow, that he might seem rather to find, than receive it. Provided I know that I give it, no matter for his knowing from whence it comes that receives it. Many a man stands in need of help, that has not the face to confess

Chap.VII. Of BENEFITS. 45

confels it: if the discovery may give offence, let it lye conceal'd; He that gives to be seen, would never relieve a man in the dark. It would be tedious to run through all the Niceties that may occurre upon this Subject. But, in two words; he must be a Wise, a Friendly, and a Well-bred man, that perfectly acquits himself in the Art, and Duty of Obliging, for, all his Actions must be squared according to the Measures of *Civility, Good Nature, and Discretion.*

CHAP. VIII.

The Difference and Value of Benefits.

WE have already spoken of *Benefits* in General; the *Matter*, and the *Intention*; together with the *Manner* of conferring them. It follows now, in Course, to say something of the *Value* of them; which is rated, either by the Good they do us, or by the Inconvenience they save us, and has no other Standard than that of a judicious Regard, to Circumstance, and Occasion. Suppose I save a Man from Drowning, the Advantage of Life is all one to him, from what hand soever it comes, or by what means: but, yet there may be a vast difference in the Obligation. I may do it with Hazard, or with Security; with Trouble or with Ease; Willingly, or by Compulsion; upon Intercession, or without it; I may have a Prospect of vain Glory,
or

or Profit; I may do it in Kindness to Another; Or, a hundred *By-Ends* to my self; and every poynt does exceedingly vary the Case. Two Persons may part with the same Sum of Money, and yet not the same Benefit; the One had it of his *own*; and it was but a *little* out of a *great deal*; the Other *borrow'd* it; and bestow'd upon me that which he wanted for himself. Two Boyes were sent out to fetch a certain Person to their Master: The one of them hunts up and down, and comes home again awearry, without finding him; the other falls to play with his Companions at the Wheel of Fortune, sees him by chance passing by, delivers him his Errant, and brings him. He that found him by chance deserves to be punish'd; and he that sought for him, and mis'd him, to be rewarded for his good Will.

IN some Cases we value^a the Thing; in others, the *Labour*, and *Attendance*. What can be more precious than Good Man-

^a We value the Thing, the Labour, or Attendance,

ners,

ners, good Letters, Life, and Health? and yet we pay our Physitians, and Tutors, only for their Service in their Professions. If we buy things cheap, it matters not, so long as 'tis a Bargain: 'tis no Obligation from the Seller, if nobody else will give him more for't. What would not a Man give to be set a shore in a Tempest? For a House in a Wilderness? A Shelter, in a Storm? A Fire, or a bit of Meat, when a Man's pinch'd with Hunger, or Cold? A Defence against Thieves, and a Thousand other Matters of great Moment, that cost but little? And yet we know, that the Skipper has but his freight for our Passage; and the Carpenters and Bricklayers do their Work by the day. Those are many times the greatest Obligations, in truth, which, in vulgar Opinion are the smallest: as Comfort to the Sick, Poor, Captives; good Counsel; keeping of People from Wickedness, &c. Wherefore we should reckon our selves to owe most for the Noblest Benefits. If the Physitian adds Care, and Friendship, to the duty of

Chap.VIII. Of BENEFITS.

of his Calling, and the Tutor; to the common method of his business; I am to esteem of them as the nearest of my Relations: for, to watch with me; to be troubled for me; and, to put off all other Patients for my sake, is a particular kindness: and so is it in my Tutor, if he takes more pains with me, than with the rest of my fellows. It is not enough, in this Case, to pay the One his Fees, and the other his Salary; but I am indebted to them over and above for their Friendship. The meanest of Mechaniques, if he does his work with Industry, and Care, 'tis an usual thing to cast in something by way of reward, more than the bare Agreement: And, Shall we deal worse with the Preservers of our Lives, and the Reformers of our Manners? He that gives me Himself (if he be worth taking) gives the greatest Benefit: And, this is the Present which *Æschines*, a poor Disciple of *Socrates*, made to his Master, and, as a Matter of great Consideration; *Others may have given you much*, sayes he, *but I am the only*

E

Man

Man that has left nothing to himself: This Gift, sayes Socrates, you shall never repent of, for I will take care to return it better than I found it: So that a brave Mind can never want Matter for Liberality in the meanest Condition; for, Nature has been so kind to us, that where we have nothing of Fortunes, we may bestow something of our own.

IT falls out often, that a Benefit is follow'd with an ^b Injury; let which will be foremost, it is with the latter, as with one Writing upon another; it does in a great measure hide the former, and keep it from appearing, but it does not quite take it away. We may, in some Cases, divide them, and both Requite the One, and Revenge the Other: Or otherwise compare them, to know whether I am Creditor, or Debtor. You have oblig'd me in my Servant, but wounded me in my Brother; you have sav'd my Son, but you have destroy'd my Father: In this Instance, I will allow as much as Piety, and Ju-

^b A Benefit follow'd with an Injury.

Chap. IX. Of BENEFITS.

55

Justice, and Good Nature will bear; but I am not willing to set an Injury against a Benefit. I would have some respect to the Time; the Obligation came first; and then perhaps, the one was design'd, the other against his will; under these Considerations, I would amplify the Benefit, and lessen the Injury; and extinguish the One with the Other; nay, I would pardon the Injury even *without* the Benefit, but much more *after* it. Not that a Man can be bound by one Benefit to suffer all sorts of Injuries, for, there are some Cases wherein we lye under no Obligation for a Benefit; because a greater Injury absolves it. As for Example: A Man helps me out of a Law-Suite, and afterward commits a Rape upon my Daughter; where the following Impiety cancels the antecedent Obligation: A Man lends me a little Money, and then sets my House on fire: the Debtor is here turn'd Creditor, when the Injury out-weighs the Benefit. Nay, if a Man does but so much as repent of a good Office done, and grow Sour

and Insolent upon it, and upbraid me with it : if he did it only for his own Sake, or for any other Reason, than for mine ; I am in some degree, more, or less, acquitted of the Obligation. I am not at all beholden to him that makes me the Instrument of his own Advantage. He that does me good for his own sake, I'll do him good for mine.

c The Case of a Conditional Redemption. SUPPOSE a Man makes Suit for a Place, and cannot obtain it, but upon the ranfome of ten Slaves out of the Gallies. If there be Ten, and no more, they owe him nothing for their Redemption, they are yet endebted to him for the Choice, for he might have taken Ten others as well as these. Put the Case again, that by an Act of Grace so many Prisoners are to be released ; their Names to be drawn by Lot, and mine happens to come out among the rest : One part of my Obligation is to him that put me in a Capacity of Freedom ; and, the other is to Providence, for

Chap.VIII. Of BENEFITS. 53

for my being one of that Number. The greatest Benefits of all, have no Witnesses, but lie concealed in the Conscience.

THERE'S a great difference betwixt a Common Obligation, and a Particular; ^{dObligations Common and Personal.} he that lends my Country Money, obliges me, only as a Part of the Whole. *Plato* cross'd the River, and the Ferry-Man would take no Money of him: he reflected upon it as an honor done to himself; and told him, *That Plato was in his debt.* But *Plato*, when he found it to be no more than he did for others, recalled his Word, *For, sayes he, Plato will owe nothing in particular, for a Benefit in Common; what I owe with others, I will pay with others.*

SOME will have it, that the Necessity ^{eObligations upon Necessity.} of wishing a Man well, is some abatement to the Obligation in the doing of him a good Office. But, I say, on the Contrary,

trary, that it is the greater, because the good will cannot be chang'd. 'Tis one thing to say, That a Man could not but do me this or that Civility, because he was forc'd to't; and another thing, That he could not quit the good Will of doing it. In the former Case, I am a Debtor to him that impos'd the force; in the other, to himself. An Unchangeable good Will is an indispensable Obligation: and, to say, that Nature cannot go out of her Course, does not discharge us, *of what we owe to Providence.* Shall he be said to Will, that may change his Mind the next moment? And, Shall we question the Will of the Almighty, whose Nature admits no change? Must the Stars quit their Stations, and fall foul one upon another? Must the Sun stand still in the middle of his Course, and Heaven and Earth drop into a Confusion? Must a devouring Fire seize upon the Universe; the Harmony of the Creation be dissolv'd; and the whole Frame of Nature swallow'd up in a dark Abyſſe? and, Will nothing less than

Chap. VIII. Of BENEFITS.

55

than this serve to convince the VVorld of their audacious and impertinent Follies? It is not to say, that, *These Heavenly Bodies are not made for us*; for, in part they are so; and we are the better for their Virtues and Motions, whether we will or no: though undoubtedly the Principal Cause, is the unalterable Law of God. Providence is not mov'd by any thing from without; but, the Divine VVill is an Everlasting Law; an Immutable Decree; and the Impossibility of Variation proceeds from God's purpose of persevering; for he never repents of his first Counsels. **A** It is not with our Heavenly, as with our Earthly Father. God thought of us, and provided for us, before he made us: (for, unto him all future events are present:) Man was not the VVork of Chance; his Mind carries him above the flight of Fortune, and naturally aspires to the Contemplation of Heaven, and Divine Mysteries. How desperate a Phrensy is it now, to undervalue;

may, to contemn, and to disclaim
these Divine Blessings, without which
we were utterly incapable of enjoy-
ing any other ?

CHAP. IX.

CHAP. IX.

*An Honest Man cannot be Out-done in
Courtesie.*

IT passes in the World for a Generous, and a Magnificent saying, that, *'Tis a shame for a Man to be out-done in Courtesie*: And, it's worth the while to examine both the Truth of it, and the Mistake. First, there can be no shame in a Virtuous Emulation; and, Secondly, there can be no Victory, without crossing the Cudgels, and yielding the Cause. One Man may have the Advantages of Strength, of Meanes, of Fortune; and this will undoubtedly operate upon the Events of good Purposes, but yet without any diminution to the Virtue. The good Will may be the same in Both, and yet One may have the Heels of the Other; For, it is not in a good Office, as in a Course, where he wins the Plate that comes first to the Post: And even there al-
so,

so, Chance has many times a great hand in the Success. Where the Contest is about Benefits; and that the One has not only a *Good Will*, but *Matter* to work upon, and a *Power* to put that Good Intent in Execution: And the Other has barely a *Good Will*, without either the *Means*, or the *Occasion* of a Requitall, if he does but affectionately wish it, and endeavour it; the latter is no more Overcome, in Courtesie, than he is in Courage, that dies with his Sword in his Hand, and his Face to the Enemy, and, without Shrinking, maintains his Station: For, where *Fortune* is *Partial*, 'Tis enough that the *Good Will* is *Equal*. There are two Errors in this Proposition: First, to imply, that a good Man may be Overcome; and then, to imagine, that any thing Shameful can befall him. The *Spartans* prohibited all those Exercises where the Victory was declar'd by the Confession of the Contendent. The 300 *Fabii* were never said to be *Conquer'd*, but *Slain*; nor *Regulus* to be Overcome, though he was taken Prisoner.

Chap. IX. Of BENEFITS. 39

ner by the *Carthaginians*. The Mind may stand firm under the greatest Malice, and Iniquity of Fortune; and yet the Giver, and the Receiver, continue upon equal Termes: As we reckon it a drawn Battel, when two Combatants are parted, though the One has lost more Blood than the Other. He that knowes how to Owe a Courtesie, and heartily wishes that he could Requite it, is Invincible; So that every Man may be as Grateful as he pleases. 'Tis Your Happiness to Give, 'tis My Fortune, that I can only Receive. What advantage now has your Chance over my Virtue? But, there are some Men that have Philosophiz'd themselves almost out of the sense of Humane Affections; as *Diogenes*, that walk'd Naked, and Unconcern'd, through the middle of *Alexanders* Treasures; and was, as well in other Mens Opinions, as in his Own, even above *Alexander* himself, who, at that time, had the whole World at his Feet: for, there was more that the One scorn'd to Take, than that the Other had

had in his Power to Give; And, it is a greater Generosity for a Beggar to Refuse Money, than for a Prince to Bestow it. This is a remarkable Instance of an immoveable Mind; and there's hardly any contending with it; but a Man is never the less valiant for being worsted by an Invulnerable Enemy; nor the Fire one jot the weaker, for not consuming an Incombustible Body; nor a Sword ever a whit the worse for not cleaving a Rock that is impenetrable; neither is a Grateful Mind overcome for want of an Answerable Fortune. No matter for the Inequality of the things Given, and Received, so long as, in point of good Affection, the two Parties stand upon the same Level. 'Tis no Shame not to overtake a man, if we follow him as fast as we can. That Tumor of a Man, the Vainglorious *Alexander*, was us'd to make his Boast, that never any man went beyond him in Benefits; and yet he liv'd to see a poor fellow in a Tub, to whom there was nothing that he could Give, and from whom
there

Chap. IX. Of BENEFITS.

63

there was nothing that he could take away.

NOR is it always necessary for a poor
 a Man to fly to the Sanctuary of
 an Invincible Mind, to quit
 scores with the Bounties of a
 Plentiful Fortune; but, it does
 often fall out, that the Returns which
 he cannot make in *kind*, are more than
 supply'd in *dignity*, and *value*. *Arche-*
laus, a King of *Macedon*, invited *Socra-*
tes to his Palace; but he excus'd him-
 self as unwilling to Receive greater Be-
 nefits than he was able to Requite.
 This perhaps was not *Pride* in *Socrates*,
 but *Craft*; for he was afraid of being
 forc'd to accept of something which
 possibly might have been unworthy of
 him: beside that he was a Man of Li-
 berty, and loth to make himself a vo-
 luntary Slave. The truth of it is, that
Archelaus had more need of *Socrates*,
 than *Socrates* of *Archelaus*; for, he want-
 ed a Man to teach him the Art of Life,
 and Death, and the Skill of Govern-
 ment; to Read the Book of Nature to
 him,

a Wise Friend
 is the Noblest of
 Presents.

him, and shew him the Light at Noon day: He wanted a Man; that, when the Sun was in an Eclipse, and he had lock'd himself up in all the horror, and despair imaginable; he wanted a Man, I say, to deliver him from his apprehensions, and to expound the Prodigy to him, by telling him, That there was no more in't, than only that the *Moon* was got betwixt the *Sun*, and the *Earth*, and all would be well again presently. Let the World Judge now, whether *Archelans* his *Bounty*, or *Socrates* his *Philosophy*, would have been the greater Present: He does not understand the Value of Wisdom, and Friendship, that does not know a wise Friend to be the Noblest of Presents. A Rarity scarce to be found, not only in a Family, but in an Age; and no where more wanted than where there seems to be the greatest store. The greater a Man is, the more need he has of him; and the more difficulty there is both of finding, and of knowing him. Nor is it to be said, that, *I cannot requite such a Benefactor, because I am poor, and have it*
not;

Chap. IX. OF BENEFITS.

63

not ; I can give good Counsel ; a Conversation, wherein he may take both Delight, and Profit ; Freedome of Discourse without Flattery ; kind attention, where he deliberates ; and Faith inviolable where he trusts ; I may bring him to a love, and knowledge of Truth ; deliver him from the Errors of his Credulity, and teach him to distinguish betwixt Friends, and Parasites.

CHAP. X.

CHAP. X.

*The Question discuss'd, Whether or no
a Man may Give, or Return a Be-
nefit to himself.*

THERE are many Cases wherein
a Man speaks of himself as of a-
nother. As for Example. *I may thank
myself for this. I am angry at my self;
I hate my self for That.* And this way
of Speaking has rais'd a Dispute a-
mong the Stoicks, *Whether or no a
Man may Give, or Return a Benefit to
himself.* For, say they, if I may hurt
my Self, I may oblige my Self; and,
that which were a Benefit to another
Body, Why is it not so to my Self?
And, Why am not I as Criminal in
being Ungrateful to my Self, as if I
were so to another body? And, the
Case is the same in Flattery, and sever-
al other Vices; as on the other side, it
is a point of great Reputation, for a
Man

Chap.X. Of BENEFITS. 65

Man to Command himself. *Plato* thank'd *Socrates* for what he had *Learn'd* of him; and, Why might not *Socrates* as well thank *Plato* for that which he had *Taught* him? *That which you want*, sayes *Plato*, *borrow it of your Self*. And, Why may not I as well Give to my Self, as Lend? If I may be Angry with my Self, I may Thank my Self; and, if I Chide my Self, I may as well Commend my Self, and do my Self Good, as well as Hurt: There's the same reason of Contraries. 'Tis a Common thing to say, *Such a Man has done himself an Injury*. If an Injury, Why not a Benefit? But, I say, that no Man can be a Debtor to himself; for, the Benefit must naturally precede the Acknowledgment; and, a Debtor can no more be without a Creditor, than a Husband, without a Wife. Some body must Give, that some Body may Receive: and, 'tis neither Giving, nor Receiving, the passing of a thing from one hand to the other. What if a Man should be Ungrateful

in the Case? there's Nothing lost; for, he that gives it, has it: and he that Gives, and he that Receives, are one and the same Person. Now, properly Speaking, no Man can be said to bestow any thing upon himself, for he obeys his Nature, that prompts every Man to do himself all the good he can. Shall I call him Liberal, that gives to himself; or Good Natur'd that pardons himself; or Pittiful, that is affected with his own Misfortunes? That which were Bounty, Clemency, Compassion, to another, to my Self, is Nature. A Benefit is a voluntary thing; but, to do good to my Self, is a thing Necessary. Was ever any Man commended for getting out of a Ditch, or for helping himself against Thieves? Or, What if I should allow, that a Man may conferr a Benefit upon himself? yet he cannot owe it, for he returns it in the same instant that he receives it. No Man Gives, Owes, or Makes a Return, but to Another. How can one Man do

do that, to which two Parties are requisite in so many respects? Giving, and Receiving must go backward, and forward, betwixt two Persons. If a Man Give to himself, he may Sell to himself: But, to sell, is to alienate a thing, and to translate the right of it to Another; now, to make Man both the Giver, and the Receiver, is to Unite Two contraries. That's a Benefit, which, when it is Given, may possibly not be Requited; but he that Gives to himself, must necessarily Receive what he Gives; beside that all Benefits are Given for the Receivers sake; but, that which a Man does for himself, is for the sake of the Giver.

THIS is one of those Subtilties, which, though hardly worth a Mans while, yet it is not labor absolutely lost neither. There is more of Trick, and Artifice in it, than Solidity; and yet there's matter of diver-

tion ~~no~~; enough perhaps to pass a-
way a Winters Evening, and keep
a Man Waking that's heavy-head-
ed.

CHAP. XI.

CHAP. XI.

How far one Man may be oblig'd for a Benefit done to Another.

THE Question now before us, requires *Distinction*, and *Cautions*. For, though it be both Natural, and Generous, to wish well to my Friends Friend; yet, a *Second-hand Benefit* does not bind me any further, than to a *Second-hand Gratitude*: So that I may Receive great Satisfaction, and Advantage, from a Good Office done to my Friend, and yet lie under no Obligation my self. Or, if any Man thinks otherwise; I must ask him in the first place, Where it begins; and, How far it extends? that it may not be boundless. Suppose a Man Obliges the Son; Does that Obligation work upon the Father? and, Why not upon the Uncle too? The Brother? The Wife? The Sister? The Mother? Nay, upon all that have any Kindness for him? and,

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upon

upon all the Lovers of his Friends? and upon all that love them too? and so *in Infinitum*. In this Case we must have Recourse, as is said heretofore, to the Intention of the Benefactor; and fix the Obligation upon him, unto whom the Kindness was directed. If a Man Manures my Ground; keeps my House from burning, or falling, 'tis a Benefit to me, for I am the better for it, and my House and Land are Insensible. But, if he save the Life of my Son, the Benefit is to my Son. It is a Joy, and a Comfort to me, but no Obligation. I am as much concern'd as I ought to be in the Health, the Felicity, and the Wellfare of my Son; as happy in the Enjoyment of him; And, I should be as unhappy as is possible in his Loss; but, it does not follow, that I must of necessity lie under an Obligation, for being either happier, or less miserable, by another bodies meanes. There are some Benefits, which, although conferr'd upon one Man, may yet work upon others; as a Sum of Money may be given to a poor Man for his own sake,

lake, which, in the Consequence, proves the Relief of his whole Family; but still the immediate Receiver is the Debtor for it; for, the Question is not, To whom it comes afterward to be transferr'd; but, Who is the Principal? and, upon whom it was first bestow'd? My Son's Life is as dear to me as my own; and, in saving him, you preserve me too: In this Case I will acknowledge my self Oblig'd to you; that is to say, in my Son's Name: for in my own, and in strictness, I am not: but, I am content to make my self a Voluntary Debtor. What if he had borrow'd Money? My paying of it, does not at all make it my Debt. It would put me to the blush perhaps, to have him taken in Bed with another Mans Wife; but, that does not make me an Adulterer. 'Tis a wonderful Delight, and Satisfaction that I receive in his Safety: but, still this Good is not a Benefit. A Man may be the better for an Animal, a Plant, a Stone; but, there must be a Will, and Intention, to make it an Obligation,

on. You save the Son, without so much as knowing the Father; Nay, without so much as thinking of him; and, perhaps, you would have done the same thing even if you had hated him. But, without any farther Altercation of Dialogue; the Conclusion is this, if you meant him the Kindness, he is answerable for it; and I may enjoy the fruit of it, without being Oblig'd by't. But if it was done for My Sake, then am I accomptable. Or, howsoever, upon any Occasion, I am ready to do you all the Kind Offices imaginable; not as the Return of a Benefit, but as the Earnest of a Friendship: which you are not to challenge neither, but to entertain as an Act of Honor, and of Justice, rather than of Gratitude. If a Man find the Body of my dead Father in a Desert, and give it Burial; if he did it as to my Father, I am beholden to him; but, if the Body was Unknown to him, and that he would have done the same thing for any other Body, I am no further

con-

concern'd in it, than as a Piece of Publick Humanity.

THERE are moreover, some Cases, wherein an Unworthy Person may be ^a oblig'd, for the sake of others; and the sottish Extract of an antient Nobility may be preferr'd before a better Man, that is but of yesterdayes standing.

a An unworthy Person may be oblig'd, for the sake of those that are more worthy.

And, it is but reasonable, to pay a Reverence, even to the Memory of eminent Virtues. He that is not Illustrious in Himself, may yet be reputed so in the Right of his Ancestors. And there is a gratitude to be Entail'd upon the Off-spring of famous Progenitors. Was it not for the *Fathers* sake, that *Cicero* the Son was made *Consul*? And, was it not the Eminence of *one Pompey*, that rais'd and dignify'd the rest of his Family? How came *Caligula* to be the Emperor of the World? a Man so Cruel, that he spilt Blood as greedily as if he were to drink it; the Empire was not given to Himself, but to his Father *Germanicus*;

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A braver Man deserved that for him, which he could never have challenged upon his own Merit. What was it that preferr'd *Fabius Persicus*? (whose very Mouth was the Uncleanest part about him;) What was it, but the 300 of that Family that so generously oppos'd the Enemy, for the safety of the Common-wealth?

b Providence is self is gracious to the Wicked Posterity of an Honorable Race.

NAY, ^bProvidence it self is gracious to the Wicked Posterity of an Honorable Race. The Counsels of Heaven are guided by Wisdom, Mercy, and Justice. Some Men are made Kings for their proper Virtues, without any respect to their Predecessors. Others, for their Ancestors sakes, whose Virtues, though neglected in their Lives, come to be afterward rewarded in their Issue. And, it is but Equity, that our Gratitude should extend as far as the Influence of their Heroical Actions, and Examples.

CHAP. XII.

The Benefactor must have no By-Ends.

WE come now to the main point of the Matter in Question; that is to say, Whether or no it be a thing desirable in it self, the Giving, and Receiving of Benefits? There is a Sect of Philosophers, that accompts nothing Valuable, but what is Profitable; and so makes all Virtue Mercenary: An Unmanly Mistake, to imagine, that the Hope of Gain, or Fear of Loss, should make a Man either the more, or the less Honest. As who should say, *What shall I Get by't, and I'll be an honest Man?* Whereas, on the Contrary, Honesty is a thing in it self to be purchas'd at any rate. It is not for a Body to say, *It will be a Charge; a Hazard; I shall give Offence, &c.* My Business is to do what I ought to do: All other Considerations are forreign to the Office. Whensoever

soever my duty calls me, 'tis my part to attend, without Scrupulizing upon Forms, or Difficulties. Shall I see an honest Man oppressed at the Barr, and not assist him, for fear of a Court-Faction? Or not second him upon the High-way against Thieves, for fear of a Broken-head? And chuse rather to sit still, the quiet Spectator of Fraud, and Violence? Why will Men be Just, Temperate, Generous, Brave, but because it carries along with it Fame, and a good Conscience? And for the same Reason, and no other (to apply it to the Subject in hand) let a Man also be Bountiful. The School of *Epicurus*, I'm sure, will never swallow this Doctrine: (That Effeminate Tribe of Lazy, and Voluptuous Philosophers) They'll tell you, that Virtue is but the Servant and Vassail of Pleasure. No, says *Epicurus*, *I am not for Pleasure neither, without Virtue.* But, Why then for Pleasure; say I, before Virtue? Not that the Stress of the Controversie lies upon the Order only; for, the Power of it, as well as the Dignity, is now under

der debate. It is the Office of Virtue to Superintend, to Lead, and to Govern; But, the parts you have assign'd it, are, to Submit, to Follow, and to be under Command. But this, you'll say, is nothing to the purpose, so long as both sides are agreed, that there can be no Happiness without *Virtue*: Take away *That*, sayes Epicurus, and I'm as little a *Friend to Pleasure* as you. The Pinch, in short, is this: Whether Virtue it self be the Supreme Good, or only the Cause of it? It is not the inverting of the Order that will clear this Point; (though 'tis a very preposterous Error, to set that first which should be last.) It does not half so much offend me, the Ranging of Pleasure before Virtue, as the very Comparing of them; and the bringing of two Opposites, and profess'd Enemies, into any sort of Competition.

The Drift of this Discourse is, to support the Cause of Benefits; and, to prove, that it is a Mean, and Dishonourable thing, to Give, for any other End,

*a Give only for
Giving sake.*

End, than for ^a Giving-sake He that Gives for Gain, Profit, or any By-End, destroys the very Intent of Bounty; For, it falls only upon those that do not want; and perverts the Charitable Inclinations of Princes, and of Great Men, who cannot reasonably propound to themselves any such End. What does the Sun get by travelling about the Universe; by visiting, and comforting all the quarters of the Earth? Is the whole Creation made, and order'd for the good of Mankind, and every particular Man only for the good of himself? There passes not an hour of our Lives, wherein we do not enjoy the Blessings of Providence without Measure, and without Intermission. And, What Design can the Almighty have upon us, who is in himself full, safe, and inviolable? If he should Give only for his own Sake, What would become of Poor Mortals, that have nothing to return him at best, but Dutiful Acknowledgments? 'Tis putting out of a Benefit

nefit to Interest, only to Bestow where we may place it to Advantage.

Let us be Liberal then, after the Example of our Great Creator ; and Give to others, with the same Consideration that he gives to us.

^b *Epicurus* his Answer will be to this, That God gives no Benefits at all, but turns his back upon the World ; and, without

^b *The Epicureans deny a Providence, the Stoicks assert it.*

any Concern for us, leaves Nature to take her Course : And, whether he does any thing himself, or nothing, he takes no notice however, either of the Good, or of the Ill that is done here below. If there were not an Ordering, and an Over-Ruling Providence ; How comes it (say I, on the other side) that the Universality of Mankind should ever have so Unanimously agreed in the Madness of Worshipping a Power that can neither Hear, nor Help us ? Some Blessings are freely given us ; Others, upon our Prayers, are granted us ; and every day brings forth Instances of great, and of Seasonable

nable Mercies, There never was yet any Man so Insensible, as not to Feel, See, and Understand a Deity in the ordinary Methods of Nature ; though many have been so obstinately Ungrateful , as not to confess it : Nor is any Man so wretched, as not to be a Partaker in that Divine Bounty. Some Benefits, 'tis true, may appear to be unequally divided. But, 'tis no small matter yet that we Possess in Common ; and, which Nature has bestow'd upon us in her very self. If God be not Bountiful , whence is it that we have all that we pretend to ? that which we Give, and that which we Deny ; that which we Lay up, and that which we Squander away ? Those innumerable delights, for the Entertainment of our Eyes, our Eares, and our Understandings ? Nay , that Copious Matter even for Luxury it self ? For, care is taken, not only for our Necessities, but also for our Pleasures, and for the Gratifying of all our Senses, and Appetites. So many pleasant Groves, Fruitful, and Salutary Plants ; so many
fair

fair Rivers, that serve us both for Recreation, Plenty, and Commerce; Vicissitudes of Seasons; Varieties of Food, by Nature made ready to our hands; all sorts of Curiosities and of Creatures; and the whole Creation it self Subjected to Mankind for Health, Medicine, and Dominion. We can be thankful to a Friend for a few Acres, or a little Money, and yet for the Freedom, and Command of the whole Earth, and for the great Benefits of our Being, as Life, Health, and Reason, we look upon our selves as under no Obligation. If a Man bestowes upon us a House, that is delicately beautified with Paintings, Statues, Gildings, and Marble, we make a mighty business of it, and yet it lies at the Mercy of a Puff of Wind, the Snuff of a Candle, and a hundred other Accidents to lay it in the dust. And, Is it nothing now to sleep under the Canopy of Heaven, where we have the Globe of the Earth for our place of Repose, and the Glories of the Heavens for our Spectacle? How comes it that we should so much value what

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we

we have, and yet at the same time be so unthankful for it? Whence is it that we have our breath, the comforts of light, and of heat, the very blood that runs in our veins? The Cattel that feed us, and the Fruits of the Earth that feed them? Whence have we the Growth of our Bodies, the Succession of our Ages, and the Faculties of our Mindes? So many Veins of Mettles, Quarries of Marble, &c. The Seed of every thing is in it self, and it is the blessing of God that raises it out of the dark into Act, and Motion. To say nothing of the charming Varieties of Musique; beautiful Objects, Delicious Provisions for the Palate; Exquisite Perfumes which are Cast in over and above to the common Necessities of our Being.

*c God and Nature
are one and the
same Power.*

ALL this, sayes *Epicurus*, we are to ascribe to *c Nature*. And, Why not to God, I beseech yee? As if they were not both of them one and the same Power working in the whole, and in every part of it. Or, if you call him the

Almighty

Almighty Jupiter; the *Thunderer*, the *Creatour*, and *Preserver* of us all; it comes to the same Issue: Some will express him under the Notion of *Fate*; which is only a Connexion of Causes, and himself the Uppermost, and Original, upon which all the rest depend. The *Stoicks* represent the several *Functions* of the *Allmighty Power* under several *Appellations*, When they speak of him as the *Father*, and the *Fountain of all Beings*, they call him *Bacchus*: and, under the Name of *Hercules*, they denote him to be *Indefatigable*, and *Invincible*: And, in the Contemplation of him in the *Reason*, *Order*, *Proportion*, and *Wisdom* of his Proceedings, they call him *Mercury*: So that which way soever they look, and under what Name soever they Couch their Meaning, they never fail of finding him: for he is every where, and fills his own Work. If a Man should borrow Money of *Seneca*, and say that he owes it to *Annew*, or *Lucius*, he may change the Name, but not his Creditor; for, let him take which of the three Names

he pleases, he is still a Debtor to the same Person. As Justice, Integrity, Prudence, Frugality, Fortitude, are all of them the Goods of one and the same Mind, so that whichsoever of them pleases us, we cannot distinctly say, That it is This, or That, but the Mind.

BUT, not to carry this Digression too far, that which God himself does, we are sure is well done; and, we are no less sure, that ^d for whatsoever

*d The Divine
Bounty expects no
Return.*

ever he gives, he neither Wants, Expects, nor Receives any thing in Return: So that the only end of a Benefit ought to be the Advantage of the Receiver; And that must be our scope without any By-regard to our selves. It is objected to us, the singular caution we prescribe in the Choice of the Person, for, it were a Madness, we say, for a Husbandman to Sow the Sand: Which, if true, say they, you have an eye upon Profit, as well in Giving, as in Plowing, and Sowing. And then they say again, That, if the conferring of a Benefit were desirable

firable in it self, it would have no dependence upon the choice of the Man, for, let us give it When, How, or Where-soever we please, it would be still a Benefit. This does not at all affect our Assertion: for the Person, the Matter, the Manner, and the Time, are Circumstances absolutely necessary to the Reason of the Action; there must be a right Judgment in all respects to make it a Benefit. It is my duty, to be true to a Trust, and yet there may be a time, or a place, wherein I would make little difference betwixt the Renouncing of it, and the Delivering of it up, and, the same Rule holds in Benefits; I will neither render the One, nor bestow the Other to the Damage of the Receiver. A wicked Man will run all risques to do an Injury; and to compass his Revenge; and, Shall not an Honest Man venture as far to do a Good Office? All Benefits must be Gratuitous; A Merchant sells me the Corn, that keeps me and my Family from starving; but, he sold it for his Interest, as well as I bought it for

mine, and so I owe him nothing for't. He that Gives for Profit, Gives to Himself, as a Physitian, or a Lawyer gives Counsel for a Fee, and only makes use of me for his own Ends; as a Graſtier ſats his Cattel, to bring them to a better Market. This is more properly the driving of a Trade, than the Cultivating of a generous Commerce. This for That, is rather a Truck than a Benefit; and he deserves to be Couſen'd, that Gives any thing in hope of a Return. And, in truth, What End ſhould a Man honourably propound? Not Profit ſure; That's *Vulgar*, and *Mechanique*, and he that does not Contemn it, can never be Grateful. And then for *Glory*, 'tis a mighty matter indeed for a Man to boast of doing his Duty. We are to Give, if it were only to avoid *not Giving*; If any thing comes on't, 'tis Clear Gain; and, at worſt, there's nothing left; beſide, that one Benefit well plac'd, makes amends for a Thouſand Miſcarriages. It is not that I would exclude the Benefactor neither, for being himſelf the better for a good Office

Office he does for another. Some there are that do us good only for their own sakes ; Others, for Ours ; and some again for both. He that does it for me in Common with himself, if he had a prospect upon Both in the doing of it, I am oblig'd to him for it ; and glad with all my heart that he had a share in't. Nay, I were ungrateful, and unjust, if I should not rejoyce, that what was Beneficial to me, might be so likewise to himself.

TO pass now to the Matter of Gratitude, and Ingratitude ; there never was any Man yet so wicked, as not to approve of the One, and detest the Other ; as the two things in the whole World, the one to be the most Abominated, the other the most Esteem'd. The very Story of an Ungrateful Action puts us out of all Patience, and gives us a loathing for the Author of it. *That Inhumane Villain, we cry, to do so horrid a thing : Not that Inconsiderate Fool, for omitting so profitable a Virtue, which*

*e All Men detest
Ingratitude, and
love the contrary.*

plainly shewes the sense we naturally have, both of the One, and of the Other, and that we are led to't by a Common Impulse of Reason, and of Conscience. *Epicurus* Phanſies God to be without Power, and without Armes; above fear himself, and as little to be fear'd. He places him betwixt the Orbes Solitary, and Idle, out of the Reach of Mortals, and neither hearing our Prayers, nor minding our Concerns; and allows him only such a veneration, and respect, as we pay to our Parents. If a Man should ask him now, Why any Reverence at all, if we have no Obligation to him? Or rather, Why that greater Reverence to his fortuitous Attomes? His Answer would be, that it is for their Majesty, and their Admirable Nature, and not out of any hope, or Expectation from them. So that by his proper Confession, a thing may be desirable for its own worth. But, sayes he, Gratitude is a Virtue that has commonly profit annex'd to it. And, Where's the Virtue, say I, that has not

not? but still the virtue is to be valued for it self, and not for the Profit that attends it; There is no Question, but Gratitude for Benefits received, is the ready way to procure more; and, in requiting one Friend, we encourage many; but, these Accessions fall in by the By, and, if I were sure that the doing of good Offices would be my Ruine, I would yet pursue them. He that Visits the Sick, in hope of a Legacy, let him be never so Friendly in all other Cases, I look upon him in this to be no better than a Raven, that watches a weak Sheep, only to peck the Eyes Out. We never Give with so much Judgment, or Care, as when we consider the Honesty of the Action, without any regard to the Profit of it; for, our Understandings are Corrupted by Fear, Hope, and Pleasure.

CHAP. XIII.

There are many Cases wherein a Man may be Mindèd of a Benefit, but it is very rarely to be Challeng'd, and never to be Upbraided.

IF the World were as Wise, and as Honest as it should be, there would be no need of Caution or Precept, how to behave our selves in our several Stations, and Duties; For, both the Giver and the Receiver would do what they ought to do of their own accord: The one would be Bountiful, and the other Grateful; and, the only way of minding a Man of one good turn, would be the following of it with another. But, as the Case stands, we must take other Measures, and consult the best we can, the Common Ease, and Relief of Mankind.

AS there are several sorts of
 a Ungrateful Men, so there must *a Diverse sorts of*
 be several wayes of dealing *Ingratitude.*
 with them : either by Artifice, Coun-
 sel, Admonition, or Reproof, according
 to the humour of the Person, and the
 degree of the Offence; Provided al-
 wayes, that as well in the Re-minding
 a Man of a Benefit, as in the Bestowing
 of it, the Good of the Receiver be the
 principal thing intended. There is a
 Curable Ingratitude, and an Incura-
 ble: there is a Slothful, a Neglectful,
 a Proud, a Dissembling, a Disclaiming,
 a Heedless, a Forgetful, and a Maliti-
 ous Ingratitude; and, the Application
 must be suited to the Matter we have
 to Work upon. A gentle Nature may
 be reclaim'd by Authority, Advice, or
 Reprehension; A Father, a Husband, a
 Friend, may do good in the Case.
 There are a sort of Lazy, and Sluggish
 People, that live as if they were asleep,
 and must be Lugg'd and Pinch'd to
 awaken them. These Men are betwixt
 Grateful, and Ungrateful; they will
 neither

neither deny an Obligation, nor return it, and only want quickening. I will do all I can to hinder any Man from ill doing; but especially a Friend, and yet more especially from doing ill to me. I will rub up his Memory with new Benefits: if that will not serve, I'll proceed to good Counsel, and from thence to Rebuke: If all failes, I'll look upon him as a desperate Debtor, and e'en let him alone in his Ingratitude, without making him my Enemy: for, no Necessity shall ever make me spend time, in wrangling with any Man upon that point.

*h Perseverance in
Obliging.*

^b ASSIDUITY of Obliging Strikes upon the Conscience, as well as the Memory, and pursues an Ungrateful Man, till he becomes Grateful. If one good Office will not do't, try a Second, and then a Third. No Man can be so thankless, but either Shame, Occasion, or Example, will, at some time or other, prevail upon him. The very Beasts themselves, even Lions, and Tigers, are gain'd

gain'd by good usage: beside, that one Obligation does naturally draw on another; and a Man would not willingly leave his own Work imperfect. *I have help'd him thus far, and I'll e'en go through with it now.* • So that over and above the delight, and the virtue of Obliging, one good turn is a Shooing-horn to another. This, of all Hints, is perhaps the most effectual, as well as the most Generous:

IN some^c Cases it must be carry'd more home; as in that of *Julius Cæsar*, who, as he was hearing of a Cause, the Defendant finding himself pinch'd. Sir, sayes he, *Do not you remember a Strain you got in your Ankle, when you Commanded in Spain; and that a Soldier lent you his Cloak for a Cushion, upon the top of a Craggy Rock, under the shade of a little Tree, in the heat of the day?* I remember it perfectly well, sayes Cæsar, and that when I was ready to choke with Thirst, an honest Fellow fetch'd me a draught of Water in his Helmet. But, that Man,

c In some cases a Man may be minded of a Benefit.

and

and that Helmet (sayes the Soldier) Does Cæsar think that he could now know them again if he saw them ? The Man perchance I might (sayes Cæsar, somewhat offended) but not the Helmet ; but, What's this Story to my Business ? You are none of the Man : Pardon me, Sir, sayes the Soldier, I am that very Man ; but Cæsar may well forget me, for I have been Trepann'd since, and lost an Eye at the Battel of Munda, where that Helmet too had the honour to be cleft with a Spanish Blade. Cæsar took it as it was intended ; and, it was an Honorable, and a Prudent way of refreshing his Memory. But, this would not have gone down to well with Tiberius ; for, when an Old Acquaintance of his began his Address to him, with *You Remember Cæsar*. No, sayes Cæsar, (cutting him short) *I do not Remember what I WAS*. Now, with him, it was better to be Forgotten, then Remembred : for, an *Old Friend* was as bad as an *Informer*. It is a Common thing for Men to hate the Authors of their Preferment, as the Witnesses of their Mean Original.

THERE

THERE are some People well enough dispos'd to be ^dGrateful, but they cannot hit upon't without a Prompter: they are a little like School-boyes, that have Treacherous Memories; 'tis but helping them here and there with a word, when they stick, and they'll go through with their Lesson; they must be taught to be Thankful, and, 'tis a fair step, if we can but bring them to be willing, and only offer at it. Some Benefits we have neglected; some we are not willing to remember. He is Ungrateful that Disownes an Obligation; and so is he that Dissembles it, or, to his Power, does not Requite it; but, the worst of all is, he that forgets it. Conscience, or Occasion may revive the rest, but here, the very Memory of it is lost. Those Eyes that cannot endure the light are weak, but those are stark blind that cannot see it. I do not love to hear People say, *Alas! poor Man, he has forgotten it*: As if that were the Excuse of Ingratitude, which

*d Some People
would be Grate-
ful if they had a
Prompter.*

which is the very cause of it: For, if he were not Ungrateful, he would not be Forgetful, and lay that out of the way which should be alwayes uppermost, and in sight. He that thinks, as he ought to do, of requiting a Benefit, is in no danger of forgetting it. There are indeed some Benefits so great, that they can never slip the Memory; but, those which are less in value, and more in number, do commonly scape us. We are apt enough to acknowledge, That, *such a Man has been the Making of us*; so long as we are in possession of the advantage he has brought us; but, new Appetites deface old Kindnesses, and we carry our Prospect forward to something more, without considering what we have obtain'd already. All that is past we give for lost; so that we are only intent upon the future. When a Benefit is once out of Sight, or out of Use, 'tis buried.

IT

IT is the Freak of many people, they cannot do a good Office, but they are presently ^c boasting of it, Drunk or Sober; and about it goes into all Companies, what wonderful things they have done for this Man, and what for t'other. A foolish, and a dangerous vanity, of a doubtful Friend, to make a certain Enemy. For, these Reproches, and Contempts, will set every Bodies Tongue a Walking; and People will conclude, that these things would never be, if there were not something very extraordinary in the Bottom on't. When it comes to that once, there is not any Calumny but fastens more, or less; nor any falshood so incredible, but in some part or other of it, shall pass for a Truth. Our great Mistake is this, we are still inclin'd to make the most of what we Give, and the least of what we Receive; whereas we should do the clean contrary. *It might have been more, but he had a great many to oblige.*

*c There must be
no upbraiding of
Benefits.*

H

It

It was as much as he could well spare ; he'll make it up some other time, &c. Nay, we should be so far from making publication of our Bounties, as not to hear them so much as mention'd, without sweetening the matter ; As, Alas ! I owe him a great deal more than that comes to. If it were in my Power to serve him, I should be very glad on't. And, this too, not with the Figure of a Complement, but with all Humanity, and Truth. There was a Man of Quality, that, in the Triumviral Proscription was sav'd by one of Cæsars Friends, who would be still twitting him with it, who it was that preserv'd him, and telling him over and over, You had gone to Pot, Friend, but for me. Pray'e, sayes the Proscribed, let me hear no more of this, or e'en leave me as you found me : I am thankful enough of my self to acknowledge, That I owe you my life ; but, 'tis Death to have it rung in my Ears perpetually as a Reproach : It looks as if you had only sav'd me, to carry me about for a spectacle. I would fain forget the Misfortune
that

Chap. XIII. Of BENEFITS. 99

that I was once a Prisoner, without being led in Triumph every day of my Life.

OH! the Pride, and Folly of a great Fortune, that turns Benefits into Injuries! That delights in Excesses, and disgraces every thing it does. Who would receive any thing from it upon these termes? The higher it raises us, the more sordid it makes us. Whatsoever it Gives, it Corrupts. What is there in it that should thus puff us up? By what Magick is it that we are so transform'd, that we do no longer know our selves? Is it Impossible for greatness to be liberal without Insolence? The Benefits that we receive from our Superiors are then wellcome, when they come with an Open Hand, and a clear Brow: Without either contumely, or State: and so as to prevent our Necessities. The Benefit is never the greater for the making of a bustle, and a noise about it; but, the Benefactor

*f Some Bounties
are bestowed with
Insolence.*

factor is much the less for the Ostentation of his good deeds; which makes that Odious to us, which would be otherwise Delightful. *Tiberius* had gotten a Trick, when any Man had begg'd Money of him, to refer him to the Senate, where all the Petitioners were to deliver up the Names of their Creditors. His End perhaps was, to deter Men from Asking, by exposing the Condition of their Fortunes to an Examination. But, it was however a Benefit, turn'd into a Reprehension; and, he made a Reproach of a Bounty.

*g In what Case a
Man may be re-
minded of a Bene-
fit.*

BUT, & 'tis not enough yet to forbear the Casting of a Benefit in a Man's Teeth; for, there are some, that will not allow it to be so much as challeng'd. For, an Ill Man, say they, will not make a Return, though it be demanded, and a Good Man will do it of himself. And then the Asking of it seems to turn it into a Debt: It is a kind

Chap. XIII. Of BENEFITS. 101

kind of Injury to be too quick with the former; for, to call upon him too soon, reproaches him, as if he would not have done it otherwise. Nor would I Recall a Benefit from any Man, so as to force it; but, only to receive it. If I let him quite alone, I make my self guilty of his Ingratitude; and undoe him for want of Plain-Dealing. A Father Reclaimes a Disobedient Son. A Wife Reclaimes a Dissolute Husband; and one Friend excites the languishing Kindness of another: How many Men are lost for want of being touch'd to the quick? So long as I am not press'd, I will rather desire a Favour, than so much as mention a Requital; but, if my Country, my Family, or my Liberty be at Stake, my Zeal and Indignation shall overrule my Modesty, and the World shall then understand, that I have done all I could not to stand in need of an Ungrateful Man. And, in conclusion, the Necessity of receiving a Benefit shall overcome the shame of Recalling it. Nor is it on-

ly allowable upon some Exigents, to put the Receiver in Mind of a Good Turn, but it is many times for the Common Advantage of both Parties.

CHAP. XIV.

CHAP. XIV.

How far to Oblige, or Requite a Wicked Man.

THERE are some Benefits, where-
of a Wicked Man is wholly Incapable: of which, hereafter. There are others, which are Bestow'd upon him, not for his own sake, but for Secondary Reasons; and, of these, we have spoken, in part, already. 'There are moreover certain Common Offices of Humanity, which are only allow'd him as he is a Man, and without any regard, either to Vice, or Virtue. To pass over the First Point: the Second must be handled with Care, and Distinction, and not without some seeming Exceptions to the General Rule; As first, Here's no *Choice*, or *Intention* in the Case, but, 'tis a good Office done him for some *By-Interest*, or by *Chance*. Secondly, There's no *Judgment* in it neither, for 'tis to a *Wicked Man*. But, to shorten the Matter; without these

Circumstances it is not properly a Benefit; or, at least, not to him: for, it looks another way. I rescue a Friend from Thieves, and the other 'scapes for Company. I Discharge a Debt for a Friend, and the other comes off too, for they were both in a Bond. The Third is of a great Latitude, and varies, according to the degree of Generosity on the one side, and of Wickedness on the other. Some Benefactors will Supererogate, and do more than they are bound to do: And, some Men are so lewd, that 'tis dangerous to do them any sort of Good; no not so much as by way of Return, or Requit.

*a How to oblige an
Ungrateful Man.*

IF the Benefactors Bounty must extend to the Bad, as well as to the Good; Put the Case that I promise a good Office to an Ungrateful Man; We are first to distinguish (as is said before) betwixt a *Common Benefit*, and a *Personal*; betwixt what is given for *Merit*, and what for *Company*. Secondly, Whether or no we know the Person to be Ungrate.

Chap. XIV. Of BENEFITS. 105

grateful, and can reasonably conclude, that his Vice is *Incurable*. Thirdly, A Consideration must be had of the Promise, how far that may oblige us. The two first Points are clear'd both in one: We cannot justifie any particular Kindness for one that we conclude to be a hopelessly wicked Man: So that the force of the Promise is the single Point in Question. In the Promise of a good Office to a Wicked or Ungrateful Man, I am to blame if I did it knowingly; and, I am to blame nevertheless, if I did it otherwise: but, I must yet make it good (under due Qualifications) because I promis'd it: that is to say, Matters continuing in the same State, for no Man is answerable for Accidents. I'll Sup at such a Place, though it be cold; I'll rise at such an hour, though I be sleepy; but, if it prove tempestuous, or that I fall sick of a Feaver, I'll neither do the one, nor the other. I promise to second a Friend in a Quarrel, or to plead his Cause; and, when I come into the Field, or into the Court, it proves to be against my Father, or my Brother;

Brother : I promise to go a Journey with him; but, there's no Travelling upon the Road for Robbing; my Child is fallen sick; or my Wife in Labour: These Circumstances are sufficient to discharge me; for, a Promise against Law, or Duty, is void in its own Nature. The Counsels of a Wise Man are Certain; but Events are uncertain. And yet if I have pass'd a rash Promise, I will in some degree punish the Temerity of making it, with the damage of keeping it. Unless it turn very much to my shame, or detriment; and then I'll be my own Confessor in the Point, and rather be once guilty of Denying, than alwayes of Giving. It is not with a Benefit as with a Debt; It is one thing to trust an ill Pay-Master, and another thing to oblige an unworthy Person: The one is an ill Man, and the other only an ill Husband.

THERE was a Valiant Fellow in the Army, that *Philip* of *Macedon* took particular Notice of; and he gave him several considerable Marks of the Kindness

Chap. XIV. Of BENEFITS. 107

ness he had for him. This Soldier puts to Sea, and was cast away upon a Coast, where a Charitable Neighbour took him up half dead; carry'd him to his House, and there at his own Charge maintain'd, and provided for him Thirty dayes, till he was perfectly recover'd: and, after all, furnish'd him over and above with a *Vitaticum* at parting. The Soldier told him the mighty matters that he would do for him in Return, so soon as he should have the honor once again to see his Master. To Court he goes, tells *Philip* of the Wreck, but not a Syllable of his Preserver, and begs the Estate of this very Man that kept him alive. It was with *Philip*, as with many other Princes, that give they know not what, especially in a time of War. He granted the Soldier his Request, contemplating at the same time the Impossibility of satisfying so many ravenous Appetites as he had to please. When the good Man came to be turn'd out of all, he was not so Mealy-Mouth'd as to thank his Majesty for not giving away
his

his Person too, as well as his Fortune; but, in a Bold, Frank Letter to *Philip*, made a just report of the whole Story. The King was so Incens'd at the Abuse, that he immediately commanded the Right Owner to be restor'd to his Estate, and the Unthankful Guest and Soldier to be Stigmatiz'd. for an Example to others. Should *Philip* now have kept this Promise? First, he ow'd the Soldier nothing. Secondly, It would have been Injurious, and Impious, and lastly, a President of dangerous Consequence to Humane Society. For, it would have been little less than an Interdiction of Fire and Water to the miserable, to have inflicted such a Penalty upon Relieving them. So that there must be alwayes some tacite Exception, or Reserve: *If I can, If I may; or, if matters continue as they were.*

*b The Case of an
Obligation from
one that after-
wards betrays his
Country,*

b I F it should be my Fortune to receive a Benefit from one, that afterwards Betrayes his Country, I should still reckon my self oblig'd to him for such

Chap.XIV. Of BENEFITS. 109

a Requitall as might stand with my publick duty. I would not furnish him with Armes, nor with Money, or Credit, to Levy or Pay Soldiers; but, I should not stick to Gratifie him at my own expence, with such Curiosities as might please him one way, without doing mischief another; I would not do any thing that might contribute to the Support, or Advantage of his Party. But, What should I do now in the Case of a Benefactor, that should afterwards become, not only mine, and my Countreyes Enemy, but the Common Enemy of Mankind? I would here distinguish betwixt the Wickedness of a Man, and the Cruelty of a Beast: betwixt a limited, or a particular Passion, and a Sanguinary Rage, that extends to the hazard, and destruction of Humane Society. In the former Case I would quit Scores, that I might have no more to do with him; but, if he comes once to a delight in Blood, and to act Outrages with greediness: to study, and invent Torments, and to take pleasure in them, the Law of Reasonable Nature

ture has discharg'd me of such a Debt. But, this is an Impiety so rare, that it might pass for a Portent, and be reckon'd among Comets, and Monsters. Let us therefore restrain our Discourse to such Men as we detest without horror; such Men as we see every day in Courts, Camps, and upon the Seats of Justice: to such Wicked Men I will Return what I have Receiv'd, without making any Advantage of their Unrighteousness.

*c Providence is
gracious even to
the Wicked.*

¶ I T does not divert the Almighty from being still Gracious, though we proceed daily in the abuse of his Bounties.

How many are there that enjoy the Comfort of the Light, that do not deserve it, that wish they had never been born; and yet Nature goes quietly on with her Work; and allows them a Being, even in despite of their unthankfulness. Such a Knave, we cry, was better us'd than I. And, the same Complaint we extend to Providence it self. How many Wicked Men have
good

Chap.XIV. Of BENEFITS. IIII

good Crops, when better than themselves have their Fruits blasted? Such a Man, we say, has treated me very ill. Why what should we do, but that very thing which is done by God himself? That is to say; Give to the Ignorant, and Persevere to the Wicked. All our Ingratitude, we see, does not turn Providence from Pouring down of Benefits, even upon those that question whence they come. The Wisdom of Heaven does all things with a regard to the Good of the Universe, and the Blessings of Nature are granted in Common, to the VVorst, as well as to the Best of Men; for, they live promiscuously together; and, it is Gods VWill, that the VVicked shall rather fare the better for the Good, than that the Good shall fare the worse for the Wicked: 'Tis true, that a Wise Prince will confer peculiar Honors only upon the Worthy; but, in the dealing of a publick Dole, there's no Respect had to the Manners of the Man, but a Thief, or a Traitor, shall put in for a share as well as an Honest Man. If a Good Man

Man, and a Wicked, sail both in the same bottom, it is impossible that the same Wind, which favours the one, should cross the other. The Common Benefits of Laws, Priviledges, Communities, Letters, and Medicines, are permitted to the Bad, as well as to the Good, and no Man ever yet Suppressed a Sovereign Remedy, for fear a VVicked Man might be cur'd with it. Cities are built for both sorts, and the same Remedy works upon both alike. In these Cases we are to set an Estimate upon the Persons, there's a great difference betwixt the Chusing of a Man, and the not Excluding him; The Law is open to the Rebellious, as well as to the Obedient: There are some Benefits, which, if they were not allow'd to all, could not be enjoy'd by any. The Sun was never made for me, but for the Comfort of the VVorld, and for the Providential Order of the Seasons; and yet I am not without my Private Obligation also. To conclude, he that will not Oblige the VVicked, and the Ungrateful, must resolve to
Oblige

Chap. XIV. OF BENEFITS. 113

Oblige no body ; for, in some sort or other, we are all of us Wicked, we are all of us Ungrateful, every Man of us.

WE have been Discourſing all this while, how far a Wicked Man may be Oblig'd, and the *Sticks* tell us, at laſt, that he cannot be Oblig'd at all : For, they make him Incapable of any Good, and conſequently of any Benefit. But, he has this Advantage, that if he cannot be Oblig'd, he cannot be Ungrateful ; for, if he cannot receive, he is not bound to a Return. On the other ſide, a Good Man, and an Ungrateful are a Contradiſtion : So that at this rate there's no ſuch thing as Ingratitude in Nature. They compare a Wicked Mans Mind to a Vitiated Stomach ; he Corrupts whatever he Receives, and the beſt Nouriſhment turns to the Diſeaſe. But, taking this for granted, a Wicked Man may yet be ſo far Oblig'd as to paſs for Ungrateful, if he does not Requite what he Receives.

*A Wicked Man
is Incapable of a
Benefit.*

himſelf,

I

For,

For, though it be not a perfect Benefit; yet he Receives something like it. There are goods of the Mind, the Body, and of Fortune. Of the first sort Fools, and VVicked Men, are wholly Incapable; to the rest they may be admitted. But VVhy should I call any Man Ungrateful; you'll say, for not Restoring That which I deny to be a Benefit? I answer, That if the Receiver take it for a Benefit, and fails of a Return, 'tis an Ingratitude in him; for that which goes for an Obligation among wicked Men, is an Obligation upon them: and they may pay one another in their own Quoin; the Money is Current, whether it be Gold, or Leather, when it comes once to be Authorized. Nay, *Cleantes* carries it farther; He that is wanting, sayes he, to a kind Office, though it be no Benefit, would have done the same thing if it had been one; and is as guilty, as a Thief is, that has set his Booty; and is already Arm'd, and Mounted, with a purpose to seize it, though he has not yet drawn Blood. VVickedness is form'd

Chap. XIV. OF BENEFITS. 115

form'd in the heart; and, the Matter of Fact is only the Discovery, and the Execution of it. Now, though a wicked Man cannot either Receive, or Bestow a Benefit, because he wants the VVill of doing good, and for that he is no longer wicked, when Virtue has taken possession of him; yet we commonly call it one, as we call a Man illiterate that is not Learn'd, and Naked, that is not well clad; not but that the one can Read, and the other is Cover'd.

and of all good for I

~~Good I am not to be~~
Good Grace too, which we
follow it with more and with
our other Uplifting of the

thing. It is a Common (but to be
that upon the heights of the Re-

which is much in itself com-

At C. xv. for all Circumstances in the
the weight, to Commence the

action.

CHAP. XV.

CHAP. XV.

A General View of the Parts, and Duties of the Benefactor.

THE three main Points in the Question of Benefits, are, First, *A Judicious Choice in the Object*; Secondly, in the *Matter of our Benevolence*; And, Thirdly, a *Gracious Felicity in the Manner of expressing it*. But, there are also incumbent upon the Benefactor other Considerations, which will deserve a Place in this Discourse.

a Obligations must be follow'd, without Upbraiding, or Repining.

IT is not enough to do one Good Turn, and to do it with a Good Grace too, unless we follow it with more; and without either ^aUpbraiding, or Repining. It is a Common shift, to charge that upon the Ingratitude of the Receiver, which, in truth, is most commonly the Levity, and Indiscretion of the Giver; for, all Circumstances must be duely weigh'd, to Consummate the Action.

Chap. XV. Of BENEFITS. 119

Action. Some there are that we find Ungrateful; but, what with our Forwardness, Change of Humor, and Reproaches, there are more that we make so. And, this is the Business: We Give with Design, and, Most to those that are able to give Most again. We Give to the Covetous, and to the Ambitious; to those that can never be thankful; (for their desires are Insatiable) and to those that will not. He that is a Tribune, would be a Prætor; the Prætor a Consul; never reflecting upon what he was, but only looking forward to what he would be. People are still Computing, *Must I lose this, or that Benefit?* if it be lost, the fault lies in the ill bestowing of it; for, rightly plac'd, it is as good as Consecrated; if we be deceiv'd in another, let us not be deceiv'd in our selves too. A Charitable Man will mend the Matter; and say to himself, *perhaps he has forgot it; perchance he could not; perhaps he will yet Require it.* A Patient Creditor will, of an ill Pay-Master, in time, make a good Creditor; an Ob-

stinate. Goodness overcomes an ill disposition; as a Barren Soyl is made Fruitful by Care and Tillage. But, let a Man be never so Ungrateful, or Inhumane; he shall never destroy the Satisfaction of my having done a good Office.

*b we must perse-
vere in doing good.*

BUT, What if others will be wicked? Does it follow that we must be so too? If others will be Ungrateful, Must we therefore be Inhumane? To Give, and to Lose, is Nothing; but, to Lose, and to Give still, is the Part of a great Mind. And the others, in effect, is the greater Loss; for, the one does but lose his Benefit, and the other loses himself. The Light shines upon the Profane, and Sacrilegious, as well as upon the Righteous. How many disappointments do we meet with in our Wives, and Children, and yet we couple still? He that has lost one Battel, hazards another. The Mariner puts to Sea again after a Wreck. An Illustrious Mind does not propose the Profit of a good

Chap. XV. Of BENEFITS. 119

good Office, but the Duty. If the World be Wicked, we should yet persevere in Well-doing, even amongst Evil Men. I had rather never receive a Kindness, than never bestow one: not to *Return* a Benefit is the Greater Sin, but not to *Confer* it, is the Earlier. We cannot propose to our selves a more glorious Example, than that of the Almighty; who neither needs, nor expects any thing from us; and yet he is continually shewing down, and distributing his Mercies and his Graces among us; not only for our Necessities, but also for our Delights: as Fruits, and Seasons; Rain, and Sunshine; Veins of Water, and of Metall; and all this to the Wicked, as well as to the Good, and without any other End than the common Benefit of the Receivers. With what Face then can we be Mercenary one to another, that have receiv'd all things from Divine Providence gratis? 'Tis a common saying, *I gave such, or such a Man so much Money, I would I had thrown it into the Sea.* And yet the

Merchant Trades again after a Piracy; and the Banker ventures afresh after a bad Security. He that will do no good Offices after a disappointment, must stand still, and do just nothing at all. The Plow goes on after a Barren Year; and, while the Ashes are yet warm, we raise a new house upon the Ruins of a former. What Obligations can be greater than those, which Children receive from their Parents? And yet, should we give them over in their Infancy, it were all to no purpose; Benefits, like Grain, must be follow'd from the Seed to the Harvest. I will not so much as leave any place for Ingratitude. I will pursue, and I will encompass the Receiver with Benefits; so that let him look which way he will, his Benefactor shall be still in his Eye, even when he would avoid his own Memory. And then I will remit to one Man, because he calls for't; to another, because he does not; to a third, because he is Wicked; and, to a fourth, because he is the Contrary. I'll cast away a Good Turn up-

on

on a Bad Man, and I'll requite a Good one. The one, because it is my Duty; and the other, that I may not be in his Debt. I do not love to hear any Man complain, That he has met with a Thankless Man. If he has met but with one, he has either been very Fortunate, or very Careful. And yet Care is not sufficient. For, there is no way to scape the hazard of losing a Benefit, but the not bestowing of it; and, to neglect a Duty to my self, for fear another should abuse it. It is an others fault, if he be Ungrateful, but it is Mine if I do not Give. To find one Thankful Man, I will oblige a great many that are not so. The Business of Mankind would be at a stand, if we should do nothing for fear of Misconceptions in matters of Uncertain Event. I will try, and believe all things, before I give any Man over, and do all that is possible that I may not lose a Good Office, and a Friend together. What do I know, but he may misunderstand the Obligation? Business may

may have put it out of his head, or taken him off from't: He may have slipt his Opportunity: I will say, in Excuse of Humane Weakness, That one Mans Memory is not sufficient for all things; It is but of a limited Capacity, so as to hold only so much, and no more; and when it is once full, it must let out part of what it had, to take in any thing beside; and, the last Benefit ever sits closest to us. In our Youth, we forget the Obligations of our Infancy, and when we are Men, we forget those of our Youth. If nothing will prevail, let him keep what he has and wellcome; but, let him have a care of Returning evil for good, and making it dangerous for a Man to do his duty. I would no more Give a Benefit to such a Man, than I would lend Money to a Beggery Spendthrift; or deposite any in the hands of a known Knight of the Post. However the Case stands, an Ungrateful Person is never the better for a Reproach; if he be already harden'd in his Wickedness, he gives no heed to't; and, if he be not, it turns

Chap. XV. Of BENEFITS. 123

a doubtful Modesty, into an incorrigible Impudence: Beside that, he watches for ill Words, to pick a quarrel with them.

AS the Benefactor is not to upbraid a Benefit, so neither to delay it: The one is tiresome; and the other odious. We must not hold Men in hand, as Physicians, and Surgeons do their Patients, and keep them longer in fear, and pain, than needs, only to magnifie the Cure. A Generous Man gives easily; and Receives as he Gives, but never Exacts. He rejoyces in the Return, and Judges favourably of it whatever it be, and Contents himself with a bare thank for a Requitall. 'Tis a harder Matter with some to get the Benefit, after 'tis promis'd, than the first promise of it; there must be so many Friends made in the Case. One must be desir'd to sollicite another; and he must be entreated to move a Third, and a Fourth must be at last besought to receive it; so that the Author, upon the upshot,
has

c. There should be no delay in the doing of a Benefit.

has the least share in the Obligation. It is then welcome when it comes free, and without deduction; and no Man either to Intercept, to Hinder, or to Detain it. And, let it be of such a Quality too, that it be not only delightful in the Receiving, but, after it is Received: which it will certainly be, if we do but observe this Rule, never to do any thing for another, which we could not honestly desire for our selves,

CHAP. XVI.

How the Receiver ought to behave himself.

THERE are certain Rules, in Common, betwixt the Giver, and the Receiver: We must do both chearfully, that the Giver may Receive the Fruit of his Benefit in the very act of bestowing it. It is a just ground of Satisfaction, to see a Friend pleas'd; but, it is much more, to *make* him so. The Intention of the One is to be suited to the Intention of the other; and, there must be an Emulation betwixt them, whether shall Oblige most. Let the one say, That he has Receiv'd a Benefit, and let the other perswade himself, That he has not Return'd it. Let the One say, *I am paid*; and the other, *I am yet in your Debt*; let the Benefactor acquit the Receiver, and the Receiver bind himself: The frankness of the discharge heightens the Obligation. It

is in *Conversation*; as in a *Tennis-Court* : Benefits are to be tost like Balls ; the longer the Rest, the better are the Gamesters. The Giver, in some respect, has the Odds, because (as in a Race) he starts first, and the other must use great diligence to overtake him. The Return must be Larger than the first Obligation, to come up to't; and, it is a Kind of Ingratitude, not to render it with Interest. In a Matter of Money, 'Tis a common thing to pay a Debt out of Course, and before it be due; but we accompt our selves to owe nothing for a Good Office; whereas the Benefit increaseth by delay. So Insensible are we of the most Important affair of Humane Life. That Man were doubtless in a Miserable Condition, that could neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor feel, nor smell: but, How much more unhappy is he then, that wanting a Sense of Benefits, loses the greatest Comfort in Nature, in the Bliss of Giving, and Receiving them? He that takes a Benefit as it is meant, is in the right; for, the Benefactor has then
his

Chap. XVI Of BENEFITS. 127

his end, and his only end, when the Receiver is Grateful.

THE more glorious part, in appearance, is that of the Giver; but,^a the Receiver has undoubtedly the harder Game to play, in many regards. There are some from whom I would not accept of a Benefit; that is to say, from those upon whom I would not bestow one. For, Why should not I scorn to receive a Benefit, where I am ashamed to owe it? And, I would yet be more tender too, where I Receive, than where I Give; for, 'tis a torment to be in Debt, where a Man has no mind to pay; as it is the greatest delight imaginable to be engag'd by a Friend, whom I should yet have a Kindness for, if I were never so much oblig'd. It is a pain to an honest, and a generous Mind, to lie under a duty of affection against Inclination. I do not speak here of Wise Men, that love to do what they ought to do; that have their Passions at Command; that pre-

a The Receiver has the harder Game to Play.

scribe

scribe Laws to themselves, and keep them when they have done; but, of Men, in a State of Imperfection, that may have a good will perhaps to be honest, and yet be over-born by the Contumacy of their Affections. We must therefore have a Care to whom we become Oblig'd: and, I would be much stricter yet in the Choice of a Creditor for Benefits, than for Money. In the one Case, 'tis but paying what I had, and the Debt is discharg'd: In the other, I do not only owe more, but when I have paid that, I am still in Arriere: And, this Law is the very foundation of Friendship. I will suppose my self a Prisoner, and a notorious Villain offers to lay down a Sum of Money for my Redemption. *First*, Shall I make use of this Money, or no? *Secondly*, If I do, What Return shall I make him for't? To the First Point, I will take it; but, only as a Debt, not as a Benefit, that shall ever tie me to a Friendship with him: And *Secondly*, my Acknowledgment shall be only correspondent to such an Obligation.

It

It is a School-Question, Whether or no *Brutus*, that thought *Cæsar* not fit to live (and put himself in the head of a Conspiracy against him) could honestly have Receiv'd his Life from *Cæsar*, if he had fallen into *Cæsars* power, without examining what reason mov'd him to that Action? How great a Man soever he was in other Cases, without dispute he was extremely out in this, and below the dignity of his Profession. For a Stoick to fear the Name of a King, when yet Monarchy is the best State of Government; or there to hope for Liberty, where so great rewards were propounded, both for Tyrants, and their Slaves; For him to imagine, ever to bring the Laws to their former State, where so many thousand lives had been lost in the Contest, not so much whether they should serve or no, but who should be their Master: He was strangely mistaken sure in the Nature and Reason of things, to Phansy, that when *Julius* was gone, some body else would not start up in his place, when there

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was

was yet a *Tarquin* found, after so many Kings that were destroy'd, either by Sword or Thunder: And yet the Resolution is, That he might have Receiv'd it, but not as a Benefit; for, at that rate I owe my Life to every Man that does not take it away.

^b *A Benefit refus'd
for the Person.*

^b *GRÆCINUS JULIUS*,
(whom *Caligula* put to death,
out of a pure Malice to his Vir-
tue) had a considerable sum of Money
sent him from *Fabius Persicus* (a Man
of Great and Infamous Example) as a
Contribution toward the Expence of
Playes, and other Publick Entertain-
ments; but *Julius* would not receive
it; and some of his Friends, that had
an Eye more upon the Present, than
the Presenter, ask'd him, with some
freedome, What he meant by refusing
it? *Why* (sayes he) *Do you think that
I'll take Money, where I would not take
so much as a Glass of Wine?* After this,
Rebilus (a Man of the same stamp)
sent him a greater Sum upon the same
score. *You must excuse me* (sayes he
to

Chap. XVI Of BENEFITS. 131

to the Messenger) *for I would not take any thing of Perficus neither.*

TO match this Scruple of Receiving Mony, with another of Keeping it; and the Sum not above Three pence, or a Groat at most: ^c There was a certain *Pythagorean* that ^{c A Pythagorean Scruple.} Contracted with a Cobler for a pair of Shooes, and some three or four days after, going to pay him his Mony, the shop was shut up; and when he had knock'd a great while at the door, Friend, (sayes a Fellow) *you may hammer your heart out there, for the Man that you look for is dead.* And when our Friends are dead, we hear no more News of them; but yours that are to live again, will shift well enough (alluding to *Pythagoras his Transmigration.*) Upon this the Philosopher went away, with his Mony chinking in his hand, and well enough content to save it: at last his Conscience took check at it, and, upon Reflection, *Though the Man be dead (sayes he) to Others, he is alive to Thee; pay him what thou owest him:*

him: and so he went back presently, and thrust it into his Shop through the Chink of the door. Whatever we owe, 'tis our part to find where to pay it; and to do it without asking too; for whether the Creditor be good, or bad, the Debt is still the same.

a A forced Benefit.

IF a Benefit be forc'd upon me, as from a Tyrant, or a Superior, where it may be dangerous to refuse; this is rather Obeying than Receiving, where the necessity destroyes the choice; the way to know what I have a Mind to do, is to leave me at liberty, whether I will do it or no; but, it is yet a Benefit, if a Man does me good in spite of my Teeth; as it is none, if I do any Man good against my Will. A Man may both hate, and yet Receive a Benefit at the same time; the Mony is never the worse, because a Fool, that is not read in Quoin, refuses to take it. If the thing be good for the Receiver, and so intended, no matter how ill 'tis taken. Nay, the Receiver may be oblig'd,

Chap. XVI. Of BENEFITS. 133

lig'd, and not know it: But, there can be no Benefit, which is unknown to the Giver. Neither will I, upon any Termes, receive a Benefit from a Worthy Person that may do him a Mischief: It is the part of an Enemy, to save himself, by doing another Man harm.

BUT, Whatever we do, let us be sure alwayes to keep a Grateful Mind. *e Keep a Grateful Mind.* It is not enough to say, What Requital shall a Poor Man offer to a Prince; or, a Slave to his Patron? When it is the glory of Gratitude, that it depends only upon the good will. Suppose a Man defends my Fame; delivers me from Beggery; saves my Life; or gives me Liberty, that is more than Life. How shall I be grateful to that Man? I will receive, cherish, and rejoyce in the Benefit. Take it kindly, and it is requited: not that the Debt it self is discharg'd, but it is nevertheless a discharge of the Conscience. I will yet distinguish betwixt a Debtor, that becomes Insolvent

by Expenses upon Whores, and Dice; and another that is undone by Fire, or Thieves; Nor do I take this Gratitude for a payment; but, there is no danger, I presume, of being Arrested for such a Debt.

*If we should be
cheerful, but not
Importune in the
Returning of Be-
nefits.*

IN the Return of Benefits, let us be ready, and chearful, but not pressing. There is as much greatness of Mind in the Owing of a good Turn, as in the doing of it; and, we must no more force a requital out of season, than be wanting in it. He that precipitates a Return, does as good as say, *I am weary of being in this Mans Debt*; not but that the hastening of a Requital, as a good Office, is a Commendable Disposition; but, 'tis another thing, to do it as a discharge, for, it looks like casting off a heavy, and a troublesome burthen. 'Tis for the Benefactor to say, *when* he will receive it; no matter for the Opinion of the World, so long as I gratifie my own Conscience; for I cannot be mistaken in my self, but another

ther

ther may. He that is over-sollicitous to return a Benefit, thinks the other so likewise to receive it. If he had rather we should keep it, Why should we refuse, and presume to dispose of his Treasure, who may call it in, or let it lye out, at his choice? 'Tis as much a fault, to receive what I ought not, as not to give what I ought: for, the Giver has the Priviledge of Chusing his own time for receiving.

§ SOME are too proud in the conferring of Benefits; others, in the Receiving of them, which is, to say the Truth, intolerable. The same Rule serves both sides, as in the Case of a Father, and a Son; a Husband, and a Wife; one Friend, or Acquaintance, and another, where the Duties are known and common. There are some that will not receive a Benefit, but in Private; nor thank you for't but in your Ear, or in a Corner; there must be nothing under Hand, and Seal, no Brokers, Notaries, or Witnesses in the Case: This

g There must be no Pride, either in the conferring, or in the Receiving of Benefits.

is not so much a scruple of modesty, as a kind of denying the Obligation, and only a less harden'd Ingratitude. Some receive Benefits so coldly, and indifferently, that a Man would think the Obligation lay on the other side, as who should say, *Well, since you will needs have it so, I am content to take it.* Some again, so carelessly, as if they hardly knew of any such thing; whereas we should rather aggravate the matter, *You cannot Imagine, how many you have oblig'd in this Act: there never was so great, so kind, so seasonable a Courtesse.* *Furnius* never gain'd so much upon *Augustus*, as by a Speech, upon the getting of his Fathers Pardon for siding with *Anthony*. *This Grace, sayes he, is the only Injury that ever Caesar did me; for it has put me upon a necessity of Living, and Dying Ungrateful.* 'Tis safer to affront some people, than to oblige them; for, the better a Man deserves, the worse they'll speak of him; as if the professing of open hatred to their Benefactors, were an Argument, that they lie under no Obligation.

Some

Chap. XVI Of BENEFITS. 137

Some people are so sour, and ill-natur'd, that they take it for an Affront to have an Obligation, or a Return offer'd them, to the discouragement both of Bounty, and of Gratitude together. The not doing, and the not receiving of Benefits, are equally a Mistake. He that refuses a new one, seems to be offended at an old one: and yet sometimes I would neither return a Benefit, no nor so much as receive it, if I might.

CHAP. XVII.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Gratitude.

HE that Preaches Gratitude, pleads for the Cause both of God and Man; for, without it, we can neither be Sociable, nor Religious. There is a strange delight in the very purpose, and Contemplation of it, as well as in the Action; when I can say to my self, *I love my Benefactor; What is there in this World that I would not do, to oblige, and serve him?* Where I have not the Means of a Requital, the very Meditation of it is sufficient. A Man is nevertheless an Artist, for not having his Tools about him; or a Musician, because he wants his Fiddle; Nor is he the less brave, because his hands are bound; or, the worse Pilot, for being upon dry Ground. If I have only a Will to be Grateful, I am so. Let me be upon the Wheele; or, under the hand of the Executioner; Let me be burnt

Chap. XVII. Of BENEFITS. 139

burnt Limb, by Limb, and my whole Body dropping in the Flames, a Good Conscience supports me in all Extremes: Nay, it is comfortable even in Death it self: For, when we come to approach that point, What care do we take to summon, and call to mind all our Benefactors, and the Good Offices they have done us, that we may leave the World fair, and set our Minds in Order. Without Gratitude, we can neither have Security, Peace, nor Reputation: And, it is not therefore the less desirable, because it draws many Adventitious Benefits along with it. Suppose the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars had no other Business, then only to pass over our heads, without any effect upon our Minds, or Bodies, without any regard to our Health, Fruits, or Seasons: a Man could hardly lift up his Eyes toward the Heavens without wonder, and veneration, to see so many Millions of Radiant Lights, and to observe their Courses, and Revolutions, even without any respect to the Common good of the Universe. But
when

when we come to consider, that Providence, and Nature, are still at Work when we Sleep ; with the admirable Force, and Operation of their Influences, and Motions, we cannot then but acknowledge their Ornament to be the least part of their value ; and that they are more to be esteem'd for their Virtue, than for their Splendor. Their main End, and Use, is matter of Life, and Necessity, though they may seem to us more considerable for their Majesty, and Beauty. And so it is with Gratitude ; we love it rather for Secondary Ends, then for it Self.

We must be grateful in despite of all Oppositions.

NO Man can be Grateful without Contemning those things that put the Common People out of their Wits. We must go into Banishment ; Lay down our Lives ; Begger , and expose our selves to Reproaches : Nay, it is often seen, that Loyalty suffers the Punishment due to Rebellion ; and, that Treason receives the Rewards of Fidelity. As the Benefits of it are many, and great,

Chap. XVII. Of BENEFITS. 141

great, so are the hazards, which is the Case, more or less, of all other Virtues; and it were hard, if this, above the rest, should be both painful, and fruitless: So that though we may go currently on with it in smooth way, we must yet prepare, and resolve, (if need be) to force our passage to't, even if the way were cover'd with Thornes, and Serpents; and, fall back, fall edge, we must be Grateful still. Grateful, for the Virtue sake, and Grateful over and above upon the point of Interest; for, it preserves old Friends, and gains new ones. It is not our business to fish for one Benefit with another; and by bestowing a little, to get more: or to oblige for any sort of Expedience, but because I ought to do it, and because I love it; and that to such a degree, that if I could not be Grateful, without appearing the contrary; if I could not return a Benefit without being suspected of doing an Injury; in despite of Infamy it self, I would yet be Grateful. No Man is greater in my esteem, than he that ventures the Fame, to preserve

preserve the Conscience of an honest Man; the one is but Imaginary, the other Solid, and Inestimable. I cannot call him Grateful, who, in the instant of returning one Benefit, has his Eye upon another. He that is Grateful for Profit, or Fear, is like a Woman that is honest, only upon the Score of Reputation.

*b Gratitude is an
Obvious, a Cheap,
and an easie Vir-
tue.*

b AS Gratitude is a Necessary, and a Glorious, so is it also an Obvious, a Cheap, and an Easie Virtue: So Obvious, that wheresoever there is a Life, there is a place for it: So Cheap, that the Covetous Man may be Grateful without Expence; and so Easie, that the Sluggard may be so likewise, without Labour. And yet it is not without its Niceties too; for, there may be a Time, a Place, or Occasion, wherein I ought not to return a Benefit; Nay, wherein I may better disown it, than deliver it.

LET

LET it be understood, by the way, that 'tis one thing to be Grateful for a good Office, and another thing to Return it: the Good Will is enough in one Case, being as much as the one side demands, and the other promises; but the Effect is requisite in the other. The Physitian that has done his best, is acquitted, though the Patient dies; and so is the Advocate, though the Clyent may lose his Cause. The General of an Army, though the Battel be lost, is yet worthy of Commendation, if he has discharg'd all the parts of a prudent Commander; In this Case, the one acquits himself, though the other be never the better for't. He is a Grateful Man, that is alwayes willing and ready; and he that seeks for all means, and occasions of requiting a Benefit, though without attaining his end, does a great deal more, than the Man, that without any trouble makes an immediate Return. Suppose my Friend a Prisoner, and that I have sold my

c 'Tis one thing to be Grateful for a Benefit, and another thing to return it,

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Estate for his Ransome : I put to Sea in foul weather, and upon a Coast that's pester'd with Pyrates : my Friend happens to be Redeem'd before I come to the place; my Gratitude is as much to be esteem'd, as if he had been yet a Prisoner; and, if I had been taken, and rob'd, my self, it would still have been the same Case. Nay, there is a Gratitude in the very Countenance; for an honest Man bears his Conscience in his Face, and propounds the requital of a Good turn in the very moment of receiving it: he is Chearful, and Confident; and, in the possession of a true Friendship, deliver'd from all Anxiety. There is this difference betwixt a Thankful Man, and an Unthankful; the one is *alwayes* pleas'd in the good he has *done*, and the other only *once*, in what he has *receiv'd*. There must be a Benignity in the Estimation even of the smallest Offices; and such a Modesty as appears to be oblig'd in whatsoever it gives: As it is indeed a very great Benefit, the opportunity of doing a good Office to a worthy Man; He that attends

Chap. XVII. Of *BENEFITS*. 145

attends to the present, and remembers what's past, shall never be Ungrateful. But, Who shall judge in the Case? For a Man may be Grateful without making a Return, and Ungrateful with it. Our best way is to help every thing by a fair Interpretation; and where-soever there is a doubt, to allow it the most favourable construction: for he that is exceptionous at words, or looks, has a Mind to pick a Quarrel. For my own part, when I come to cast up my accompt, and know what I owe, and to whom, though I make my return sooner to some, and later to others, as occasion, or fortune will give me leave, yet I'll be just to all. I will be Grateful to God; to Man; to those that have Oblig'd me; nay, even to those that have oblig'd my Friends, I am bound in honor, and in Conscience, to be thankful for what I have receiv'd; and if I be not yet full, it is some pleasure still that I may hope for more. For the Requital of a Favour, there must be Virtue, Occasion, Means, and Fortune.

L

IT

*f A Man may be
over-Grateful, as
well as over-right-
eous.*

IT is a Common thing to Screw up Justice to the pitch of an Injury. A Man may be *Over-Righteous*; and, Why not *Over-Grateful* too? There is a Mischievous excess, that borders so close upon Ingratitude, that it is no easie matter to distinguish the one from the other : but, in regard that there is good Will in the bottom of it (however distemper'd ; for it is Effectually but Kindness out of the Wits) we shall discourse it under the Title of *Gratitude Mistaken*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Gratitude Mistaken.

TO refuse a Good Office, not so much because we do not need it, as because we would not be indebted for it, is a kind of Phantastical Ingratitude; and somewhat a-Kin to that Nicety of humour, on the other side, of being Over-Grateful; only it lies another way, and seems to be the more pardonable Ingratitude of the two. Some People take it for a great Instance of their Good Will, to be still wishing their Benefactors, such or such a Mischief, only, forsooth, that they themselves might be the happy Instruments of their Release. These Men do like Extravagant Lovers, that take it for a great proof of their Affection, to wish one another Banish'd, Begger'd, or diseas'd, that they might have the opportunity of interposing to their relief.

What difference is there betwixt such Wishing, and Cursing? Such an Affection, and a Mortal hatred? The Intent is good, you'll say, but this is a Misapplication of it. Let such a one fall into my Power; or into the hands of his Enemies, his Creditors, or the Common People, and no Mortal be able to rescue him but my self. Let his Life, his Liberty, and his Reputation lie all at Stake, and no Creature, but my self, in Condition to succor him. And why all this, but because he has oblig'd me, and I would requite him? If this be Gratitude, to propound Jayles, Shackles, Slavery, War, Beggery to the Man, that you would requite, What would you do where you are Ungrateful? This way of Proceeding, over and above that it is impious in it self, is likewise over-hasty, and Unseasonable: for, he that goes too fast, is as much too blame, as he that does not move at all (to say nothing of the Injustice) for if I had never been oblig'd, I should never have wish'd it. There are Seasons wherein

Chap. XVIII. Of BENEFITS. 149

wherein a Benefit is neither to be Receiv'd, nor Requited. To press a Return upon me, when I do not desire it, is Unmannerly; but it is worse, to force me to desire it. How rigorous would he be to exact a Requital, who is thus eager to return it? To wish a Man in distress, that I may relieve him; is, first to wish him Miserable; to wish that he may stand in need of any body, is *against Him*; and to wish that he may stand in need of Me, is *for my self*: So that my business is not so much a Charity to my Friend, as the Cancelling of a Bond: Nay, it is half way, the wish of an Enemy. It is Barbarous to wish a Man in Chains, Slavery, or Want, only to bring him out again: Let me rather wish him powerful, and happy, and my self indebted to him. By Nature, we are prone to Mercy, Humanity, Compassion; may we be excited to be more so, by the Number of the Grateful; may their Number increase, and may we have no need of trying them.

a we must not do
an ill thing, that
good may come of
it.

IT is not for an honest Man to make way to a Good Office by a Crime; as if a Pilot should pray for a Tempest, that he might prove his skill; or a General with his Army routed, that he might shew himself a great Commander in recovering of the day. 'Tis throwing of a Man into a River, to take him out again. 'Tis an Obligation, I confess, to cure a Wound, or a Disease; but, to make that Wound, or Disease, on purpose to Cure it, is a most perverse Ingratitude. It is barbarous even to an Enemy; much more to a Friend; For, it is not so much to do him a Kindness, as to put him in need of it. Of the two, let it be rather a Scar, than a Wound; and yet it would be better to have it neither. *Rome* had been little beholden to *Scipio*, if he had prolong'd the *Punique* War, that he might have the finishing of it at last: or to the *Decii*, for dying for their Country, if they had first brought it to the last

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Chap. XVI. Of BENEFITS. 151

Extremity of needing their Devotion. It may be a good Contemplation, but it is a lewd Wish. *Aeneas* had never been surnamed the Pious, if he had wish'd the ruine of his Country, only that he might have the honor of taking his Father out of the Fire. 'Tis the Scandal of a Physitian to make work, and irritate a Disease, and to torment his Patient for the Reputation of his Cure. If a Man should openly imprecate Poverty, Captivity, Fear, or Danger, upon a Person that he has been Oblig'd to, Would not the whole World condemn him for't? And, What's the difference; but that the One is only a private Wish, and the Other, a publick Declaration? *Rutilius* was told in his Exile, that for his Comfort, there would be ere long, a Civil War, that would bring all the Banish'd Men home again. *God forbid*, sayes he, *for I had rather my Country should blush for my Banishment, than Mourn for my Return.* How much more honorable is it to Owe chearfully,

than to Pay dishonestly? It is the wish of an Enemy to take a Town, that he may preserve it, and to be Victorious, that he may forgive; but, the Mercy comes after the Cruelty; beside, that it is an Injury both to God and Man, for, the Man must be first afflicted by Heaven, to be reliev'd by me. So that we impose the Cruelty upon God, and take the Compassion to our selves, and, at the best, it is but a Curse that makes way for a Blessing; the bare wish is an Injury; and, if it does not take effect, 'tis because Heaven has not heard our Prayers. Or, if they should succeed, the fear it self is a Torment: And, it is much more desirable, to have a firm, and unshaken Security. 'Tis Friendly to wish it in your Power to oblige me, if ever I chance to need it; but, it is unkind to wish me miserable, that I may need it. How much more Pious is it, and Humane, to wish that I may never want

Chap. XVIII. Of BENEFITS. 153

want the Occasion of Obliging, nor the Means of doing it; nor ever have reason to repent of what I have done?

CHAP. XIX.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Ingratitude.

INGRATITUDE is, of all Crimes, that which we are to accompt the most Venial in others, and the most Unpardonable in our selves. It is Impious to the highest degree; for, it makes us fight against our Children, and our Altars. There are, there ever were, and there ever will be Criminals of all sorts; as Murtherers, Tyrants, Thieves, Adulterers, Traytors, Robbers, and Sacrilegious Persons; but, there is hardly any Notorious Crime without a Mixture of Ingratitude. It disunites Mankind, and breaks the very Pillars of Society. And yet so far is this Prodigious Wickedness from being any wonder to us, that even thankfulness it self were much the greater of the two. For Men are deterr'd from it by Labour, Expense, Lazyness, Business; or else diverted from

Chap. XIX. Of BENEFITS. 155

from it by Lust, Envy, Ambition, Pride, Levity, Rashness, Fear: Nay, by the very Shame of Confessing what they have receiv'd. And the Unthankful Man has nothing to say for himself all this while; For, there needs neither Pains, nor Fortune, for the discharge of his Duty; Beside, the inward Anxiety, and Torment, when a Mans Conscience makes him afraid of his own Thoughts.

TO speak against the Ungrateful, is to raile against Mankind; ^{a We are all Ungrateful.} for, even those that complain are guilty; nor do I speak only of those that do not live up to the strict Rule of Virtue; but Mankind it self is degenerated, and lost. We live unthankfully in this World, and we go struggling and murmuring out of it; dissatisfy'd with our Lot; whereas we should be Grateful for the Blessings we have enjoy'd, and accompt that sufficient which Providence has appointed for us: A little more time may make our Lives longer, but not happier; and

and whensoever it is the pleasure of God to call us, we must obey; and yet all this while we go on quærelling at the World for what we find in our selves, and we are yet more Unthankful to Heaven, than we are to one another. What Benefit can be great now to that Man that despises the Bounties of his Maker? We would be as strong as Elephants, as swift as Bucks, as light as Birds, and we complain, that we have not the sagacity of Dogs; the sight of Eagles, the long Life of Ravens; nay, that we are not Immortal, and endur'd with the Knowledge of things to come. Nay, we take it ill, that we are not Gods upon Earth: never considering the Advantages of our Condition, or the Benignity of Providence in the Comforts that we enjoy. We subdue the strongest of Creatures, and overtake the fleetest: We reclaim the fiercest, and outwit the Craftiest. We are within one degree of Heaven it self, and yet we are not satisfied. Since there is not any one Creature which we had rather be, we take

Chap. XIX. Of BENEFITS. 157

take it ill that we cannot draw the United Excellences of all other Creatures into our selves. Why are we not rather thankful to that Goodness, which has subjected the whole Creation to our Use, and Service?

^b THE Principal Causes of Ingratitude, are Pride, and Self-Concept, Avarice, Envy, &c. ^b Causes of Ingratitude.

'Tis a familiar Exclamation, *'Tis true, he did this or that for me, but it came so late, and it was so little, I had e'en as good have been without it: If he had not given it to me, he must have given it to some body else; it was nothing out of his own Pocket:* Nay, we are so Ungrateful, that he that gives us all we have, if he leaves any thing to himself, we reckon that he does us an Injury. It cost *Julius Caesar* his Life, the disappointment of his Unsatiable Companions; and yet he reserv'd nothing of all that he got, to himself, but the liberty of disposing it. There is no Benefit so large, but Malignity will still lessen it: none so narrow, which a
good

good Interpretation will not enlarge; No Man shall ever be Grateful, that views a Benefit on the wrong side; or takes a good Office by the wrong handle. The Avaritious Man is Naturally Ungrateful, for he never thinks he has enough, but, without considering what he has, only Minds what he covets. Some pretend want of power to make a Competent Return, and you shall find in others a kind of Graceless Modesty, that makes a Man asham'd of requiting an Obligation, because 'tis a Confession that he has receiv'd one.

*c Not to return
Good for Good is
Inhumane, but E-
vil for Good, is
Diabolical.*

NOT to return one good Office for another, is Inhumane, but to return evil for good is Diabolical. There are too many even of this sort, who, the more they owe, the more they hate. There's nothing more dangerous than to oblige those People, for when they are Conscious of not paying the Debt, they wish the Creditor out of the way. It is a Mortal hatred, that which arises from the Shame of an abused

Chap. XIX. Of BENEFITS. 159

abused Benefit. When we are on the Asking side, What a deal of cringing there is, and profession? *Well, I shall never forget this Favour. It will be an eternal Obligation to me.* But, within a while, the Note is chang'd, and we hear no more words on't; till, by little and little, it is all quite forgotten. So long as we stand in need of a Benefit, there is nothing dearer to us; nor any thing cheaper, when we have receiv'd it. And yet a Man may as well refuse to deliver up a Sum of Money that's left him in Trust, without a Sute, as not to return a good Office without asking; and when we have no value any further for the Benefit, we do commonly care as little for the Author. People follow their Interest; one Man is Grateful for his Convenience, and another Man is Ungrateful for the same Reason.

SOME are Ungrateful to their Country; and their own Country no less Ungrateful to others; so that the Complaint
These are Ungrateful Governments, as well as Ungrateful Men.
of

of Ingratitude reaches all Men. Does not the Son wish for the death of his Father? the Husband for that of his Wife, &c. But, Who can look for Gratitude in an Age of so many Gaping, and Craving Appetites, where all People take, and none give? In an Age of License to all sorts of Vanity, and Wickedness; as Lust, Gluttony, Avarice, Envy, Ambition, Sloth, Insolence, Levity, Contumacy, Fear, Rashness, Private Discords, and Publick Evils, Extravagant and Groundless wishes, Vain Confidences, Sickly Affections, Shameless Impieties, Rapine Authoriz'd, and the Violation of all things Sacred, and Profane. Obligations are pursu'd with Sword and Poyson: Benefits are turn'd into Crimes; and that Blood most Seditiously Spilt, for which every honest Man should expose his own. Those that should be the Preservers of their Country, are the Destroyers of it; and, 'tis matter of dignity to trample upon the Government; The Sword gives the Law, and Mercenaries take up Armes against their

Chap. XIX. Of BENEFITS. 161

their Masters. Among these turbulent, and unruly Motions, What hope is there of finding honesty, or good Faith, which is the quietest of all Virtues? There is no more lively Image of humane life, than that of a conquer'd City: there's neither Mercy, Modesty, nor Religion, and if we forget our Lives, we may well forget our Benefits. The World abounds with Examples of Ungrateful Persons, and no less with those of Ungrateful Governments. Was not *Catiline* Ungrateful? Whose Malice aim'd, not only at the Mastering of his Country, but at the total destruction of it, by calling in an Inveterate, and Vindictive Enemy from beyond the *Alpes*, to wreak their long thirsted-for Revenge; and to Sacrifice the Lives of as many noble *Romans*, as might serve to answer, and appease the Ghosts of the Slaughter'd *Gauls*? Was not *Marius* Ungrateful? that from a Common Soldier, being raised up to a Consul, not only gave the Word for Civil Blood-shed, and

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Mas-

Massacres, but was himself the Sign for the Execution; and every Man he met in the Streets, to whom he did not stretch out his Right-hand, was Murther'd? And, Was not *Sylla* Ungrateful too? that when he had waded up to the Gates in Humane Blood, carry'd the Outrage into the City, and there most barbarously cut two entire Legions to pieces in a Corner; not only after the Victory, but most perfidiously after quarter given them. Good God! that ever any Man should not only scape with Impunity, but receive a Reward for so horrid a Villany? Was not *Pompey* Ungrateful too? who, after three Consulships, three Triumphs, and so many honors Usurp'd before his time, split the Common-wealth into three Parts; and brought it to such a pass, that there was no hope of Safety, but by Slavery; Only, forsooth, to abate the Envy of his Power, he took other Partners with him into the Government, as if that which was not lawful for any one, might have been allowable

Chap. XIX. OF BENEFITS. 163

able for more ; dividing, and distributing the Provinces, and breaking all into a *Triumvirate*, reserving still two parts of the three in his own Family. And, Was not *Cæsar* Ungrateful also? though, to give him his due, he was a Man of his Word ; Merciful in his Victories, and never kill'd any Man, but with his Sword in his hand. Let us therefore forgive one another. Only one Word more now for the shame of Ungrateful Governments. Was not *Camillus* banish'd? *Scipio* dismiss'd? and *Cicero* exil'd, and plunder'd? But, What is all this to those that are so mad, as to dispute even the goodness of Heaven, which gives us all, and expects nothing again, but continues giving to the most Unthankful, and Complaining.

CHAP. XX.

There can be no Law against Ingratitude,

INGRATITUDE is so dangerous to it self, and so detestable to other people, that Nature, one would think, had sufficiently provided against it, without need of any other Law. For every Ungrateful Man is his own Enemy, and it seems superfluous to compell a Man to be kind to himself, and to follow his own Inclinations. This, of all wickedness imaginable, is certainly the Vice which does the most divide, and distract Humane Nature. Without the Exercise, and the Commerce of Mutual Offices, we can be neither happy, nor safe; for it is only Society that secures us; Take us one by one, and we are a Prey even to Brutes, as well as to one another; Nature has brought us into the World naked, and unarm'd; we

Chap. XX. Of BENEFITS. 165

we have not the Teeth, or the Paws, of Lyons or Bears,, to make our selves terrible: but, by the two Blessings of Reason, and Union, we secure and defend our selves against Violence and Fortune. This it is that makes Man the Master of all other Creatures, who otherwise were scarce a Match for the weakest of them. This is it that comforts us in Sicknes, in Age, in Misery, in Pains, and in the worst of Calamities. Take away this Combination, and Mankind is dissociated, and falls to pieces. 'Tis true, that there is no Law established against this abominable Vice: but, we cannot say yet, that it scapes unpunish'd, for, a publick hatred is certainly the greatest of all Penalties, over and above that, we lose the most valuable Blessing of Life, in the not bestowing, and Receiving of Benefits. If Ingratitude were to be punish'd by a Law, it would discredit the Obligation; for a Benefit is to be Given, not Lent: And if we have no Return at all, there's no just Cause of Complaint: for Grati-

tude were no Virtue, if there were any danger in being Ungrateful. There are Halts, I know, Hooks, and Gibbets, provided for Homicide, Poyson, Sacrilege, and Rebellion; but Ingratitude (here upon Earth) is only punish'd in the Schools; all further pains, and Inflictions, being wholly remitted to Divine Justice. And, if a Man may Judge of the Conscience by the Countenance, the Ungrateful Man is never without a Canker at his heart; his Min and Aspect, is sad and sollicitous; whereas the other is alwayes Chearful, and Serene.

*a There neither is,
nor can be, any
Law against Ingra-
titude.*

AS there are no Laws Ex-
tant against Ingratitude; So is
it utterly Impossible to con-
trive any, that in all Circum-
stances shall reach it. If it
were Actionable, there would not be
Courts enough in the whole World,
to try the Causes in. There can be
no setting of a day for the requiting
of Benefits, as for the payment of Mo-
ny, nor any Estimate upon the Benefits
them,

Chap. XX. Of BENEFITS. 167

themselves, but the whole matter rests in the Conscience of both parties; And then there are so many degrees of it, that the same Rule will never serve all: Beside that, to proportion it, as the Benefit is greater or less, will be both impracticable, and without Reason. One good Turn saves my Life; another, my Freedom, or peradventure my very Soul. How shall any Law now suite a Punishment to an Ingratitude, under these differing degrees? It must not be said in Benefits, as in Bonds, *Pay what you owe*. How shall a Man pay Life, Health, Credit, Security, in *kind*? There can be no set Rule to bound that infinite variety of Cases, which are more properly the Subject of Humanity, and Religion, than of Law, and Publick Justice. There would be Disputes also about the Benefit it Self; which must totally depend upon the Courtesie of the Judge, for no Law Imaginable can set it forth. One Man *Gives* me an Estate; another only *Lends* me a Sword, and that Sword preserves my Life. Nay,

the very same thing several wayes done, changes the Quality of the Obligation. A Word, a Tone, a Look, makes a great Alteration in the Case, How shall we judge then, and determine a Matter, which does not depend upon the fact it self, but upon the Force, and Intention of it. Some things are reputed Benefits, not for their value, but because we desire them. And there are Offices of a much greater Value, that we do not reckon upon at all. If Ingratitude were Liable to a Law, we must never give, but before Witnesses, which would overthrow the dignity of the Benefit. And then the Punishment must either be equal, where the Crimes are unequal, or else it must be unrighteous: So that Blood must answer for Blood. He that is Ungrateful for my saving his Life, must forfeit his own. And, What can be more Inhumane, than that Benefits should conclude in Sanguinary Events? A Man saves my Life, and I am Ungrateful for it: Shall I be punish'd in my purse? That's too little:

Chup. XX. OF BENEFITS. 169

little: if it be less than the Benefit, it is unjust, and it must be Capital to be made equal to it. There are moreover certain Priviledges granted to Parents, that can never be reduc'd to a Common Rule: Their Injuries may be Cognizable, but not their Benefits. The diversity of Cases is too Large, and Intricate, to be brought within the Prospect of a Law: So that it is much more Equitable to punish none, than to punish all alike. What if a Man follows a good Office with an Injury; Whether or no shall this quit scores? or, Who shall compare them, and weigh the one against the other? There is another thing yet, which perhaps we do not dream of: Not one Man upon the face of the Earth would scape, and yet every Man would expect to be his own Judge. Once again; We are all of us ungrateful; and the Number does not only take away the Shame, but gives Authority, and Protection to the Wick- edness.

IT is thought Reasonable by some, that there should be a Law against Ingratitude, for, say they, 'Tis common for one City to upbraid another, and, to claim that of Posterity, which was bestow'd upon their Ancestors: But, this is only clamor without Reason. It is objected by others, as a discouragement to good Offices; if Men shall not be made answerable for them; but, I say, on the other side, that no Man would accept of a Benefit upon those termes. He that Gives, is prompted to't by a goodness of Mind; and, the generosity of the Action is lessen'd by the Caution; for, it is his desire, that the Receiver should please himself, and owe no more than he thinks fit. But, What if this might occasion fewer Benefits, so long as they would be franker? nor is there any hurt in putting a Check upon Rashness, and Profusion: In Answer to this; Men will be careful enough whom they oblige, without a Law; Nor is it possible for a Judge ever to set us right.

Chap. XX. Of BENEFITS. 171

right in't ; or indeed any thing else, but the Faith of the Receiver. The honor of a Benefit is this way preserv'd, which is otherwise prophan'd, when it comes to be Mercenary, and made matter of Contention. We are e'en forward enough of our selves, to wrangle without unnecessary Provocations. It would be well, I think, if Moneys might pass upon the same Conditions with other Benefits : and the payment remitted to the Conscience, without formalizing upon Bills and Securities: but Humane Wisdom has rather advis'd with Convenience, than Virtue, and chosen rather to force honesty, than to expect it. For every paltry Sum of Money, there must be Bonds, Witnesses, Counter-parts, Pawns, &c. which is no other than a shameful Confession of Fraud, and Wickedness; when more Credit is given to our Seals, than to our Minds; and Caution taken, least he that has receiv'd the Money, should deny it. Were it not better now to be deceiv'd by some, than to suspect all? What's the
the

the difference at this rate, betwixt
the Benefactor, and an Usurer, save
only that in the Benefactors Case, there
is no body stands Bound?

The End.

